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To what extent should labor unions be subjected to the proscriptions
of the Sherman Act?' This question has generated much confusion and
controversy amongst the legal community. It has been the subject of
heated debate since the Sherman Act was passed in 1890.2 After almost
one hundred years, however, courts have done very little to clarify the
confusion. The problem is two-fold. First, the antitrust laws3 and the
national labor laws4 embody two important, but at times conflicting,'
congressional declarations of public policy. On the one hand, the anti-
trust laws strive to create and maintain a freely competitive commercial
environment.6 On the other hand, the national labor laws seek to im-
prove employment conditions by eliminating competition in the labor
market over wages, hours and working conditions.7 This conflict creates
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). At the present time, labor unions enjoy two exemptions from
the Sherman Act: a statutory and nonstatutory exemption. See infra notes 216-473 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of these exemptions.
2. See 6 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 48.02, at
4 (1988).
3. The antitrust laws include the Sherman Antitrust Act, §§ 1-7 (1890) (current version
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)) and the Clayton Act, §§ 1-8, 10-16, 20, 26 (1914) (current
version codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1982)). References to the
"antitrust laws" throughout this Comment are meant to include both the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act.
4. The national labor laws consist, in part, of the following: Norris-LaGuardia Anti-
Injunction Act, §§ 1-15 (1932) (current version codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982)); Na-
tional Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, §§ 1-19 (1935) (current version codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1982)); Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947 (current version
codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982)); Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Lan-
drum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C.).
5. The United States Supreme Court recognized this conflict in Allen Bradley Co. v.
Local No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945), see infra note 269. See also Consolidated Ex-
press, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 452 F. Supp. 1024, 1036 (D.N.J. 1977) ("It is a
commonplace that the antitrust laws and the labor laws are antithetical. The antitrust laws are
designed to promote competition; the unions are in the business of limiting it."), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part;, 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980).
6. See 6 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 48.03[l], at 29. See generally 1 H. ToUL-
MIN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTI-TRuST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 93-112 (1949).
7. See Local No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co.,
381 U.S. 676, 714 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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confusion for labor unions in determining how far they can go, under the
national labor laws, before they run afoul of the antitrust laws.
The second problem arises from the United States Supreme Court's
decision to recognize two distinct exemptions from the Sherman Act for
labor unions. These two exemptions are known as labor's statutory8 and
nonstatutory9 exemptions. The statutory exemption applies only to con-
troversies arising out of unilateral union activities."' The nonstatutory
exemption applies only to controversies arising from the terms or the
enforcement of union-employer agreements.II The Supreme Court's de-
cision to bifurcate labor's exemption from the Sherman Act is inconsis-
tent with both Congress' intent and the Court's own precedent.
At the outset, this Comment explores Congress' intent in passing the
Sherman Act. More specifically, the Author focuses on whether the
Sherman Act was meant to apply to labor unions, and discusses how
courts' initially applied the Sherman Act to labor unions. The Comment
then traces the period between 1914 and 1940. During that period, Con-
gress passed several major pieces of legislation aimed at halting courts'
continued application of the Sherman Act to labor unions. Next, the
Comment analyzes in depth the present analytical framework for labor-
antitrust cases, focusing primarily on the Supreme Court's decisions that
created a nonstatutory exemption in the context of union-employer
agreements. Finally, the Author proposes a new analytical framework
from which courts might better analyze labor-antitrust problems.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SHERMAN ACT
A. Historical Climate
A proper analysis of the labor-antitrust problem necessitates a brief
historical overview of the period leading up to the passage of the Sher-
man Act in 1890.12 Prior to the Civil War, the distribution of economic
8. For a discussion of the statutory exemption see infra notes 224-89 and accompanying
text.
9. For a discussion of the nonstatutory exemption see infra notes 290-403 and accompa-
nying text.
10. See infra note 254. For a discussion of the statutory exemption see infra notes 224-89
and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 255. For a discussion of the nonstatutory exemption see infra notes 290-
403 and accompanying text.
12. For a more detailed discussion of the social and economic conditions leading to the
passage of the Sherman Act see Hoffmann, Labor and Antitrust Policy: Drawing a Line of
Demarcation, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 9-13 (1983). See also 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra
note 2, § 2.02, at 12-43; A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 23-27 (1960); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY (1955); Letwin,
Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1956).
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power in the United States was never considered a major public prob-
lem. 3 However, the period between the Civil War and 1890 saw unprec-
edented economic expansion in the United States. 4 Moreover, during
this period of enormous economic growth, trusts"5 and pools 6 flourished
in the United States. 7 Those who controlled these entities substituted
combinations for competition in an effort to control the economic power
of the nation.' 8 These powerful trusts and pools proved highly success-
ful, dominating the economic and political life of America.' 9
However, by the end of the nineteenth century, public opinion
sharply turned against these trusts and pools.2" The public viewed the
entities as powerful and ruthless,2' squeezing life out of the small, in-
dependent businessperson.22 President Grover Cleveland, in his last an-
nual message, graphically depicted the evils inflicted by these trusts and
pools.23 While applauding America's tremendous economic growth in its
first one hundred years, President Cleveland warned:
As we view the achievements of aggregated capital, we discover
the existence of trusts, combinations, and monopolies, while the
citizen is struggling far in the rear or is trampled to death be-
neath an iron heel. Corporations, which should be the carefully
restrained creatures of the law and the servants of the people,
are fast becoming the people's masters.24
13. See H. THORELLI, supra note 12, at 160.
14. Id. at 63-66, 160; see also 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 2.02[2], at 12.
15. Trusts were the most widely used business organization in the latter part of the nine-
teenth century. See 1 J. VON KAUNOWSKI, supra note 2, § 2.02[2][b], at 19. Trusts are char-
acterized by two or more corporations which, by agreement, secure control over the businesses
of all trust members. Id. For a more detailed discussion of trusts see id. at 19-22.
16. A pool is defined as a combination of persons or corporations whose object is to elimi-
nate competition between the pool members. See 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2,
2.02[2][a], at 17. Pools were extensively used in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Id.
For a more detailed discussion of pools see id. at 17-19.
17. See H. THORELLI, supra note 12, at 161.
18. Id. See also id. at 85-96 for examples of the anticompetitive practices in the railroad
and oil industries.
19. Id. at 161.
20. See Letwin, supra note 12, at 222 ("In the years immediately before the Sherman Act,
... there were few who doubted that the public hated the trusts fervently."); see also 1 J. VON
KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 2.02[3][a], at 23-24.
21. See 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 2.02[3][a], at 23. These powerful trusts
and pools constantly engaged in practices injurious to the public. Such practices included the
arbitrary raising of prices, lowering wages, and controlling the supply of basic commodities.
See Hoffmann, supra note 12, at 10; see also Limbaugh, Historic Origins of Anti-trust Legisla-
tion, 18 Mo. L. REv. 215, 236-38 (1953).
22. See 1 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 2.02[3][a], at 23.
23. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
24. Fourth Annual Message of President Grover Cleveland (Dec. 3, 1888), reprinted in 1
November 1988]
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Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century legislative action was clearly
needed to restrain these powerful entities and to restore free competition
in the commercial market place.
B. Legislative History of the Sherman Act
Against this backdrop, Senator John Sherman of Ohio introduced
an antitrust bill before the fifty-first Congress on December 4, 1889.25 It
was entitled "A BILL to declare unlawful trusts and combinations in
restraint of trade and production."26 According to Senator Sherman, the
bill's purpose was to outlaw those combinations that existed solely to
destroy competition in the commercial market place.27 In addition, Sen-
E. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RE-
LATED STATUTES 57-58 (1978); see also H. THORELLI, supra note 12, at 157. In fact, during
the 1888 Presidential campaign both major parties adopted antitrust platforms. See H.
THORELLi, supra note 12, at 151. The Republican party adopted the following resolution:
"We declare our opposition to all combinations of capital, organized in trusts... to control
arbitrarily the condition of trade among our citizens; and we recommend to Congress... such
legislation as will prevent the execution of all schemes to oppress the people ... ." Id. The
Democratic platform declared, "the interests of the people are betrayed when... trusts and
combinations are permitted to exist, which, while mainly unduly enriching the few that com-
bine, rob the body of our citizens by depriving them of the benefits of natural competition."
Id.
One year later, newly elected President Benjamin Harrison referred to the powerful trusts
as "dangerous conspiracies against the public good, [which] should be made the subject of
prohibitory and even penal legislation." First Annual Message of President Benjamin Harri-
son (Dec. 3, 1889), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra, at 60; see also H. THORELLI, supra note
12, at 159.
25. S. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1889), reprinted in 1 E. KIrNER, supra note 24, at 89-90.
Actually there were several antitrust bills introduced before the fiftieth Congress. In fact, the
bill introduced by Senator Sherman in 1889 was identical to a bill he had introduced the
previous year. See 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 16, 89 n.1.264.
26. See 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 89. Section 1 of Senator Sherman's original bill
stated in pertinent part:
That all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between per-
sons or corporations made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full and free com-
petition in the importation, transportation, or sale of articles imported into the
United States, or in the production, manufacture, or sale of articles of domestic
growth or production,... and all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or
combinations between persons or corporations designed, or which tend, to advance
the cost to the consumer of any such articles, are hereby declared to be against public
policy, unlawful, and void.
Id.; see also S. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sss. (March 18, 1890), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note
24, at 112-13 (amended version of the December 4, 1889 proposal).
27. See generally 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at
115-18. Senator Sherman made it clear that the purpose of his bill was not "to cripple combi-
nations of capital and labor, the formation of partnerships or of corporations, but only to pre-
vent and control combinations made with a view to prevent competition, or for the restraint of
trade, or to increase the profits of the producer at the cost of the consumer." Id. (emphasis
added), reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 116. Senator Sherman explained that his
bill was aimed at combinations characterized by a desire to "control the market, raise or lower
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ator Sherman expressly declared that the bill was not intended to pro-
scribe legitimate labor union activities.28
From March 21 through March 27, 1890, the Senate, sitting as a
Committee of the Whole, vehemently debated Senator Sherman's anti-
trust proposal.29 During these debates, several Senators expressed con-
cern that Senator Sherman's proposal, if adopted, might be used to
outlaw labor unions.30 Those Senators focused primarily on the language
contained in Senator Sherman's bill that specifically denounced conduct
that tended to raise consumer prices.31 Since many legitimate union ac-
tivities, such as obtaining wage increases for union members, resulted in
higher consumer prices, presumably such union activities would be pro-
hibited under Senator Sherman's bill.32 To alleviate these concerns, Sen-
ator Sherman reassured the Committee that a labor union seeking a wage
increase for its members would not be affected by the bill.3 However,
many Senators remained unconvinced prompting Senator Sherman to
propose an amendment to his bill.34 In effect, the amendment expressly
prices, as will best promote [their] selfish interests, reduce prices in a particular locality and
break down competition and advance prices at will where competition does not exist." Id.,
reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 117; see also Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310
U.S. 469, 493 n.15 (1940).
28. See supra note 27.
29. 21 CONG. Rnc. 2455-74 (March 21, 1890), 2556-72 (March 24, 1890), 2597-616
(March 25, 1890), 2639-62 (March 26, 1890), and 2723-31 (March 27, 1890), reprinted in 1 E.
KINTNER, supra note 24, at 113-274. See also Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Anti-
trust Policy: The Special Case of Sports League Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEO. L.J. 19, 45-
46 (1986).
30. Those who expressed concern included Senators Hoar, Hiscock, Stewart, -Teller and
George. See Roberts, supra note 29, at 46. Summing up these concerns, Senator Teller stated:
While I am extremely anxious to take hold of and control these great trusts, these
combinations of capital which are disturbing the commerce of the country and are
disturbing legitimate trade, I do not want to go to the extent of interfering with
organizations which I think are absolutely justifiable ....
I believe [this bill] will interfere with [labor unions] .... [WMe can not deny to
the laborers of the country the opportunity to combine either for the purpose of
putting up the price of their labor or securing to themselves a better position in the
world ....
21 CONG. Rac. 2561 (1890), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 160.
31. See supra note 26 for the contents of Senator Sherman's bill.
32. See Hoffmann, supra note 12, at 16 n.69.
33. 21 CONG. Rnc. 2562 (1890), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 162. Sena-
tor Sherman stated, "combinations of workingmen to promote their interests, promote their
welfare, and increase their pay.., are not affected in the slightest degree, nor can they be
included in the words or intent of the bill .... ." Id.
34. 21 CONG. REc. 2611-12 (1890), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 205-08.
Senator Sherman's amendment provided in pertinent part: "Provided, That this act shall not
be construed to apply to any arrangements, agreements, or combinations between laborers,
made with the view of lessening the number or hours of their labor or of increasing their wages
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exempted labor unions from the bill's proscriptions.35
The Committee of the Whole, without a roll call, adopted Senator
Sherman's amendment.36 The original bill and all adopted amendments
were then sent to the Judiciary Committee for reworking.37 While in the
Judiciary Committee, Senator Sherman's bill was dropped, and an en-
tirely new bill was drafted.38 Whereas Senator Sherman's bill focused on
conduct that tended to raise consumer prices, the Judiciary Committee's
bill focused on conduct that restrained trade.39 Although the Judiciary
Committee's bill did not contain Senator Sherman's proposed labor ex-
emption, the Senate passed it on April 8, 1890.' ° On June 20, 1890, the
House of Representatives passed the Judiciary Committee's bill without
making any substantial changes.4 ' Newly elected President Benjamin
Harrison signed the Sherman Antitrust Act42 into law on July 2, 1890.1'
... ." Id. Subsequent to Sherman's proposed amendment, Senator N.W. Aldrich of Rhode
Island offered his own additional amendment:
Provided further, That this act shall not be construed to apply to or to declare unlaw-
ful combinations or associations made with a view or which tend, by means other
than by a reduction of the wages of labor, to lessen the cost of production or reduce
the price of any of the necessaries of life, nor to the combinations or associations
made with a view or which tend to increase the earnings of persons engaged in any
useful employment.
Id. at 2654-55 (1890), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 245.
35. See supra note 34 for the text of the proposed Sherman amendment.
36. 21 CONG. REc. 2612 (1890), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 206. The
Committee also adopted other amendments including one proposed by Senator N.W. Aldrich
of Rhode Island. Id. at 2654-55 (1890), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 245. See
supra note 34 for the text of the proposed Aldrich amendment. See also 21 CONG. REc. 2727
(1890), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 265-66 (Senator Edmunds' remarks indi-
cating his strong opposition to the labor exemption amendments).
37. 21 CONG. REc. 2731 (1890), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 274.
38. Id. at 2901 (1890), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 278-79.
39. See Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes: I, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 1283, 1289
(1939).
40. 21 CONG. REc. 3153 (1890), reprinted in I E. KJNTNER, supra note 24, at 275-77, 294.
Interestingly, four of the eight members of the Judiciary Committee had earlier supported an
exemption from the Sherman Act for labor unions. Thus, presumably since these same mem-
bers supported the final bill, they must have believed the final bill exempted legitimate labor
union activities. The four supporters were Senators Hoar, Wilson, Coke and George. See id.
at 2613-16, 2658, 2728 (1890), reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 208-13, 250-52,
268-70.
41. Id. at 6312-14 (1890), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 359-63.
42. Although the Sherman Act bears Senator Sherman's name, there has been considera-
ble debate on who really authored the final version as reported by the Judiciary Committee.
See Boudin, supra note 39, at 1288-93; Hoffmann, supra note 12, at 17 n.73; see also H.
THORELLI, supra note 12, at 210-14.
43. Act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209, reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 51-52
(current version codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982) (hereinafter the Sherman Act)); see also 1
E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 366. Section 1 of the Sherman Act originally stated:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
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1. Was the Sherman Act meant to apply to labor unions?
The legislative history surrounding the Sherman Act reveals one
thing unequivocally- Congress intended to curtail the blatant anticom-
petitive activities of the powerful trusts and pools.' However, the Sher-
man Act's application to labor unions was less clear. In 1910, Samuel
Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, wrote: "[w]e
know the Sherman law was intended by Congress to punish illegal trusts
and not the labor unions, for we had various conferences with members
of Congress while the Sherman Act was pending, and remember clearly
that such a determination was stated again and again."4 Thus, for labor
leaders the answer was clear-Congress had not intended the Sherman
Act to curtail legitimate union activities.
However, the Sherman Act, in its final version, did not contain an
express labor exemption." This factor suggests Congress may have in-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or
engage in any such combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thou-
sand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra
note 24, at 51. The Sherman Act has undergone several changes since it was originally enacted
in 1890. For instance, the fine for a violation was increased from $5,000 to $50,000 in 1955.
Act of July 7, 1955, Ch. 281, 69 Stat. 282. In 1974, the fine was raised to $1,000,000 for
corporations and $100,000 for individuals. Act of December 21, 1974, Pub. L. 93-528, 88 Stat.
1706. The 1974 Act also elevated criminal violations to felony status, carrying a maximum
prison term of three years. Id. Parties who are successful in claims brought under the Sher-
man Act are entitled to treble damages and reasonable attorney's fees. See section 4 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
44. See E. BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT 3 (1930); A. NEALE & D. GOYDER,
THE ANTrrRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 16 (3d ed. 1980); M. HAN-
DLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY & H. GOLDSCHMID, TRADE REGULATION 15 (2d ed. 1983).
In Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 492-93, the Court stated:
[The Sherman Act] was enacted in the era of "trusts" and of "combinations" of
businesses and of capital organized and directed to control of the market by suppres-
sion of competition in the marketing of goods and services, the monopolistic ten-
dency of which hhd become a matter of public concern. The end sought [by the
Sherman Act] was the prevention of restraints to free competition in business and
commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices or other-
wise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers ....
See also Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959) ("the [Sherman]
Act is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and is applied only to a
very limited extent to organizations, like labor unions, which normally have other
objectives.").
45. See E. BERMAN, supra note 44, at 5. Commissioner Lennon of the United States Com-
mission of Industrial Relations further wrote in 1916, "I had the pleasure of interviewing Sen.
Sherman and Sen. Plumb and a large number of gentlemen in the Senate at the time [of the
Sherman Act], and they did not look upon it [as applying to labor unions]." Id.
46. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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tended the Sherman Act to apply to labor unions.4 7 A careful reading of
the legislative history, however, suggests that Congress, although not
wholly exempting labor unions,4" never intended the Sherman Act to
proscribe labor unions pursuing legitimate goals.4 9 Several strong argu-
ments support this proposition. 0
a. lack of criticism
When the final bill was reported out of the Judiciary Committee,51 it
was extensively debated in the Senate. 2 None of these debates, however,
concerned the bill's applicability to labor unions.5 3 This was significant,
because in the earlier debates over Senator Sherman's bill, many Senators
expressed concern over the bill's applicability to legitimate labor union
activities.54 However, none of those Senators, who earlier expressed con-
cern over Senator Sherman's bill, criticized the Judiciary Committee's
bill as proscribing such activities.55 In fact, Senators George, Hoar,
Stewart and Teller, all of whom supported the express labor exemption
47. The legislative history does not indicate why the labor exemption was dropped in the
Judiciary Committee. This has lead to confusion and speculation over whether Congress
meant to include labor unions within the Sherman Act. For an argument that Congress did
intend to include labor unions within the Sherman Act's proscriptions, see 63 CONG. REC.
13908 (1914), reprinted in 2 E. KInTNER, supra note 24, at 1837-40 (remarks of Senator Atlee
Pomerene of Ohio).
48. It is clear that a union that conspires with non-labor groups in an effort to directly
restrain the commercial market violates the Sherman Act. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No.
3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 808 (1945) ("we think Congress never intended that unions could,
consistently with the Sherman Act, aid non-labor groups to create business monopolies and to
control the marketing of goods and services."); see also Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975); Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union
v. United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962); United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926); 6 J. VON
KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 48.02, at 23 & n.27.
49. As one commentator has noted:
The most reasonable interpretation of the legislative history is that a political
compromise was reached in the Judiciary Committee.... Senator Teller, a supporter
of an express labor exemption, had stated his opposition to union "methods" that
were "beyond what was legitimate and proper." Only if unions used then "lawful
means" would they be outside the scope of the Act. Thus, the senators apparently
drafted a bill intended to outlaw direct interference with any product market but not
proscribing activities that tended only to restrain competition in the labor market.
Roberts, supra note 29, at 51; see also infra note 75.
50. See generally E. BERMAN, supra note 44, for an excellent discussion concerning the
applicability of the Sherman Act to labor unions. See also supra note 44 and accompanying
text; infra note 75 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
52. See E. BERMAN, supra note 44, at 37-38.
53. Id.
54. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
55. See E. BERMAN, supra note 44, at 38.
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attached to Senator Sherman's bill, 6 voted in favor of the Judiciary
Committee's bill.57 Moreover, Senator Sherman, who clearly supported
an exemption for legitimate labor union activities," also voted in favor of
the Judiciary Committee's bill, without ever questioning its applicability
to labor unions.5 9
Thus, the fact that those pro-labor Senators voted for the Judiciary
Committee's bill, without ever debating its applicability to labor unions,
suggests they must have believed the bill, as drafted, would not have pro-
hibited legitimate labor union activities.' Had those Senators enter-
tained the slightest doubt as to whether the bill applied to labor unions,
presumably they would have raised an objection. The absence of any
objection strongly suggests that the Judiciary Committee's bill was not
intended to proscribe legitimate labor union activities.6
b. express language
Senator Sherman's proposal, to which the express labor exemption
was attached, specifically denounced conduct that tended to raise con-
sumer prices.62 Since legitimate union activities, such as obtaining wage
increases for union members, resulted in higher consumer prices, many
Senators believed that Senator Sherman's proposal would prohibit such
union activities.6" Hence, an express labor exemption became neces-
sary."4 However, the Judiciary Committee's bill, which ultimately be-
56. See supra note 30.
57. See E. BERMAN, supra note 44, at 38. Furthermore, the Judiciary Committee, which
drafted the final bill, included several pro-labor Senators. See supra note 40. Presumably,
those pro-labor Senators would not have supported the bill had they believed the bill would
prohibit legitimate labor union activities. The fact that those Senators supported the Judiciary
Committee's bill, without objection, indicated that the bill was not meant to apply to legitimate
labor union activities.
58. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
59. See E. BERMAN, supra note 44, at 38.
60. Any other result would mean that those Senators, who earlier had defended labor's
rights during the course of the debates over Senator Sherman's proposal, completely aban-
doned their support for labor in the debates over the Judiciary Committee's bill. Such a result
is not supported by the record. See E. BERMAN, supra note 44, at 38-39.
61. This argument is particularly compelling in light of the scope of the proposed labor
exemption. The labor exemption also included an express exemption for farmers' organiza-
tions. Therefore, if the defeat of this exemption meant the inclusion of both these organiza-
tions, then farmers' organizations would be subjected to the Sherman Act. However, as one
commentator has pointed out, "[c]ertainly no one would contend that the Congress which
adopted the Sherman Act intended to include farmers' organizations within its purview."
Boudin, supra note 39, at 1285 n.5.
62. See E. BERMAN, supra note 44, at 51.
63. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
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came the Sherman Act, did not expressly prohibit conduct that tended to
raise consumer prices.6" Instead, the Judiciary Committee's bill focused
on conduct that restrained trade. 6 Presumably, the need for an express
labor exemption became unnecessary.67
The absence of a labor exemption within the express terms of the
Sherman Act was not indicative of Congress' intent to restrict legitimate
labor union activities. Rather, an express labor exemption was no longer
necessary in light of the express language of the Judiciary Committee's
bill. To suggest that Congress abandoned its desire to exempt legitimate
labor union activities under the Sherman Act when the labor exemption
was dropped in the Judiciary Committee would be wrong. The desire
remained. However, because of the marked difference in language be-
tween Senator Sherman's bill and the Judiciary Committee's bill, an ex-
press labor exemption was no longer required to fulfill Congress' desires.
Simply stated, Congress no longer believed that the Sherman Act, as
drafted by the Judiciary Committee, could be interpreted as to prohibit
legitimate labor union activities.
c. subsequent legislative history
The legislative history surrounding the passage of the Clayton Act
in 191468 provides further support for the proposition that Congress
never intended the Sherman Act to proscribe legitimate labor union ac-
tivities. 69 During the debates over the Clayton Act, many Senators ex-
pressed their disbelief that the Sherman Act was used to restrain
legitimate labor union activities.70 For example, Representative Martin
Madden of Illinois noted:
When the Sherman antitrust law was passed in the Senate it
was clearly and unequivocally stated that its provisions would
65. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
66. Id.
67. This is a very plausible argument. After all, it was the prohibition on increased con-
sumer prices, the gravamen of Senator Sherman's bill, that raised the concerns of many sena-
tors that the bill would be applied to restrict legitimate labor union activities. See supra notes
30-35 and accompanying text. Since the Judiciary Committee's bill did not condemn conduct
which tended to raise consumer prices, the need for an express labor exemption became
unnecessary.
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1982). See infra notes 99-131 and
accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
70. See, eg., Report of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 14-16 (1914), reprinted in 2 E. KiNTNER, supra note 24, at 1095-97; 51 CONG. REC.
9086-87 (1914),.reprinted in 2 E. KiNTNER, supra note 24, at 1221-22; see also infra notes 71-
72.
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not cover [labor unions]. But history shows that the victories
won under [the Sherman Act] have been the suits against labor
organizations, while great trusts and monopolies have grown
and flourished.71
Moreover, Senator William Thompson of Kansas stated:
It was never intended that [labor unions] should be included
within the terms of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and it was a
source of great surprise to the country when some of the courts
took a different view. The [Sherman Act] was originally
designed to cover industrial combinations, as is clearly demon-
strated by a review of the various speeches made in 1890, at the
time of the passage of the act.72
Hence, the legislative history surrounding the passage of the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts suggests that Congress never intended that the
Sherman Act restrain legitimate labor union activities. Rather, the Sher-
man Act Was a product of an era in which giant trusts and combinations
of business and of capital were organized in an effort to control the com-
mercial market by suppression of competition.73 Congress passed the
Sherman Act specifically to confront those anticompetitive practices.7'
C. Early Judicial Interpretations of the Sherman Act
Although doubt existed that Congress intended to apply the Sher-
man Act to legitimate labor union activities,75 early twentieth century
federal courts nevertheless subjected labor unions to the Sherman Act's
proscriptions.76 Courts justified applying the Sherman Act to labor un-
71. 62 CONG. REc. 9087 (1914) (emphasis added), reprinted in 2 E. KINrNER, supra note
24, at 1222; see also infra notes 72, 75 and accompanying text.
72. 51 CONG. REC. 13,844 (1914), reprinted in 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 24, at 1791.
Furthermore, Representative Webb of North Carolina stated, "[p]ersonally I have never had
any idea that the existence and operation of labor organizations, . . . were ever intended to
come within the provisions of the antitrust law." Id. at 9540, reprinted in 2 E. KINTNER,
supra note 24, at 1509.
73. See Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 492-93 & n.15.
74. Id. at 493 n.15.
75. See E. BERMAN, supra note 44, at 51 ("On the basis of the congressional debates [re-
garding the Sherman Act] ... no valid evidence can be found in the records of the legislative
proceedings that Congress intended the Anti-trust Act to apply to labor organizations.");
Boudin, supra note 39, at 1285-87 ("the evidence... conclusively shows that labor organiza-
tions were not intended to be included within the purview of the [Sherman] Act."); see also A.
MASON, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE LAW 120-31 (1925); Boudin, The Sherman Act and
Labor Disputes: II, 40 COLUM. L. RV. 14 (1940); Emery, Labor Organizations and the Sher-
man Law, 20 J. POL. ECON. 599 (1912); St. Antoine, ConnelL" Antitrust Law at the Expense of
Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 603 (1976); supra notes 44-74 and accompanying text.
76. In fact, courts applied the Sherman Act more frequently to union conduct than to
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ions on the grounds that Congress specifically rejected including an ex-
press labor exemption within the Sherman Act. 7 Thus, labor activity
that arguably interfered with the commercial product market came
within the scope of the Sherman Act. For example, in Loewe v. Lawler,
7 8
the United States Supreme Court interpreted section 171 of the Sherman
Act as applying to the United Hatters of North America (the Union).8 0
In Loewe, the Union attempted to secure a closed shop agreement8' with
business monopolies in the years immediately following the Act's passage. See United States v.
Cassidy, 67 F. 698 (N.D. Cal. 1895); United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724 (N.D. Ill. 1894), aff'd on
other grounds, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); In re Grand Jury, 62 F. 840 (N.D. Cal. 1894); In re Grand
Jury, 62 F. 834 (S.D. Cal. 1894); In re Grand Jury, 62 F. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1894); United States v.
Agler, 62 F. 824 (D. Ind. 1894); Thomas v. Cincinnati, 62 F. 803 (S.D. Ohio 1894); United
States v. Elliot, 62 F. 801 (E.D. Mo. 1894), 64 F. 27 (E.D. Mo. 1894); Waterhouse v. Comer,
'55 F. 149 (W.D. Ga. 1893); United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council, 54 F. 994
(E.D. La.), aff'd, 57 F. 85 (5th Cir. 1893). See also E. BERMAN, supra note 44, at 3.
The courts' favorite weapon for halting union conduct was the injunction. See I T.
KHEEL, LABOR LAW §§ 2.06-2.07, at 57-111 (1988). See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N.
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
77. In justifying its application of the Sherman Act to a labor union, the Supreme Court in
Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U.S. 274 (1908), stated that "[tihe records of Congress show that several
efforts were made to exempt, by legislation, organizations of... laborers from the operation of
the [Sherman Act], and that all these efforts failed.. . ." Io at 301. However, Professor
Berman suggested that the Court in Loewe was misled by counsel for the union and the
company:
One cannot leave the discussion of the argument of counsel in the case without call-
ing attention to the failure of the attorneys for the workers to present their case
properly. They permitted counsel for the firm to present a misleading account pur-
porting to show that Congress intended that the act should apply to labor; and they
made no effective answer to that account. An adequate presentation of the Hatters'
case to the Supreme Court might have greatly changed the history of labor cases
since 1908.
E. BERMAN, supra note 44, at 86; see also Boudin, supra note 39, at 1287. This misinforma-
tion, combined with the Court's failure to scrutinize the congressional records, may explain
why the Court applied the Sherman Act to the union.
78. 208 U.S. 274 (1908). This famous case is known as the Danbury Hatters case. For a
further discussion of the Danbury Hatters case, see E. BERMAN, supra note 44, at 77-87.
79. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of
a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dol-
lars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See supra note 43 for the original text of section I of the Sherman Act.
80. Loewe, 208 U.S. at 309. The district court had sustained the Union's contention that
its conduct did not violate the Sherman Act. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 148 F. 924 (D. Conn.
1906).
81. A closed shop agreement requires an employer to hire only union members and to
discharge all non-union employees. As a further condition of continued employment, employ-
ees must remain union members. See 8 T. KHEEL, supra note 76, § 40.0[1l], at 3 n.10. Con-
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the Loewe hat factory (the Company) located in Danbury, Connecti-
cut.8 2 The Union's efforts failed when the Company refused to open up
its factory doors to Union workers.8 3 After the Company refused, the
Union called a strike at the hat factory and boycotted the Company's
goods.8 4 In addition, the Union organized a nationwide boycott against
the Company. 5
The Union engaged in these activities in an attempt to gain recogni-
tion at the Company's factory. 6 Despite this legitimate goal, however,
the Courts7 held that the Union's primary88 strike and secondary8 9 boy-
cott9" violated the Sherman Act.91 The Court concluded that the Union,
by interfering with the manufacturing and distributing of the Company's
hats, sought to restrain trade in interstate commerce-a direct violation
of section 192 of the Sherman Act.93 That a union was involved made no
gress outlawed closed shop agreements in 1947 with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982); see infra note 193 and accompanying text. Congress did, however,
allow for modified closed shop agreements in the construction industry. See section 8(f) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1982).
82. Loewe, 208 U.S. at 304-05. For the contents of the Company's complaint, see id. at
284 n. 1.
83. The Company maintained that it was in its best interest to operate an open factory,
and thus declined to unionize. Id. at 284 n.1.
84. Id. at 307-08.
85. Id. at 304-09.
86. Id. at 305.
87. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion for the unanimous Court. Id. at 283.
88. Union pressure tactics are characterized by the object of the pressure. Union pressure
aimed at an employer with whom the union has a labor dispute is primary. Pressure exerted
on a neutral or third party employer is secondary. See Handler & Zifchak, Collective Bargain-
ing and the Antitrust Laws: The Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81 CoLuM. L. REv.
459, 461 n.8 (1981).
89. See supra note 88.
90. A secondary boycott involves a union applying economic pressure upon an employer
with whom the union has no labor dispute. This is done to induce that employer to cease
doing business with another employer with whom the union has a dispute. See A. Cox, D.
BOK & R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 617 (10th ed. 1986). Congress outlawed secondary boycotts
in 1947 with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982). See
§ 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1982).
91. Loewe, 208 U.S. at 309.
92. See supra note 79 for the text of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
93. Loewe, 208 U.S. at 300-01. Finding a Sherman Act violation conflicted with the
Court's earlier holding in United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). In E.C Knight,
the Court defined commerce to only include the actual transportation of goods. Id. at 13-14.
Thus, the manufacturing of goods was not defined as commerce for purposes of the Sherman
Act. However, in Loewe, the Court expanded E.C. Knight to include manufacturing within
the definition of commerce for purposes of the Sherman Act. Loewe, 208 U.S. at 297-301. The
Loewe Court justified this expansion of E. C.Knight on the grounds that the company's purpose
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difference to the Court.94 The Court reasoned that the Sherman Act ap-
plied because Congress had failed to include within the Act a specific
labor exemption.9" The Court stated:
[T]he congressional debates show that the [Sherman Act] had
its origin in the evils of massed capital;... [however, Congress]
made the interdiction include combinations of labor as well as
of capital; in fact, all combinations in restraint of commerce,
without reference to the character of the persons who entered
into them.96
The Loewe case was significant in that it was the first time the Supreme
Court had expressly held that the Sherman Act applied to legitimate la-
bor union activities.97 Even more important than the Supreme Court's
Loewe decision, however, was that in the period following the passage of
the Sherman Act, federal courts routinely applied the Act to circum-
in E.C. Knight was not to restrain trade, whereas in Loewe, the Court found the Union's
purpose was to restrain trade. Id.
Moreover, the Loewe Court did not concern itself with the fact the Union was pursuing
legitimate objectives, that is, attempting to organize employees. Also, the Court failed to link
the Union's activity with any attempt to monopolize the commercial market or eliminate com-
petition in the commercial market-the supposed goals of the Sherman Act.
94. Loewe, 208 U.S. at 301. The Court unanimously agreed with the Company, who
argued:
Congress did not provide that one class in the community could combine to restrain
interstate trade and another class could not. It had no respect for persons. It made
no distinction between classes. It provided that "every" contract, combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade was illegal .... Congress, therefore, has refused to
exempt labor unions from the comprehensive provisions of the Sherman law against
combinations in restraint of trade and this refusal is the more significant, as it fol-
lowed the recognition by the courts that the Sherman Anti-trust law applied to labor
organizations.
Id. at 279-80 (argument of plaintiff in error); see also supra note 77 (Company presented highly
misleading account of congressional record to Court).
95. Loewe, 208 U.S. at 301; see also supra notes 77, 94.
96. Loewe, 208 U.S. at 301-02 (quoting United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated
Council, 54 F. 994 (E.D. LA.), aff'd, 57 F. 85 (5th Cir. 1893)); see supra note 77 and accompa-
nying text.
Some commentators have suggested that the early approach courts took in applying the
Sherman Act to labor unions was characteristic of courts' early literal construction of the
Sherman Act. See, eg., R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD & J. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELATIONS
LAW 595 (6th ed. 1979). However, not all courts applied this literal interpretation. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Patterson, 55 F. 605 (C.D. Mass. 1893), Circuit Judge Putnam refused
to apply the Sherman Act to union strike and boycott activity. He did not believe that the
Sherman Act covered such union conduct, but rather only applied to monopolists or aggre-
gators of capital. Id. at 640-41. However, this case represents an anamoly during this early
period. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
97. See E. BERMAN, supra note 44, at 80. Actually, prior to the Loewe case the Supreme
Court affirmed a lower court's issuance of an injunction restraining union activity. However,
the Court did not rely on a Sherman Act analysis in its opinion. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564
(1895), aff'g, 64 F. 724 (N.D. Ill. 1894).
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scribe labor union activities.9"
III. THE PERIOD FROM 1914-1940
A. The Passage of the Clayton Act
In 1914, congressional efforts to reverse federal courts' application
of the Sherman Act to labor unions" culminated in the passage of sec-
tions 6 100 and 20101 of the Clayton Act.1" 2 Specifically, these two sec-
tions carved out an express labor exemption from the Sherman Act.103
98. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove &.Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) (Court held that union
magazine which printed employer blacklists violated § 1 of Sherman Act); 1 T. KHEEL, supra
note 76, § 4.02[I][b], at 29-39; see also supra note 76.
99. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text; see also Comment, Connell, Five Years
After: Labor's Antitrust Exemption and the Scope of the Construction Industry Proviso to Sec-
tion 8(e), 29 CATH. U. L. RPv. 799, 801 (980) ("The Sherman Act... was probably intended
to regulate only monopolistic business practices and commercial restraints on trade, [but] it
was soon applied to labor activity... [and] ... [i]n response, Congress passed the Clayton
Act's labor exemption.").
100. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982). Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and opera-
tion of labor... organizations... or to forbid or restrain individual members of such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such
organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combina-
tions or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Id.
101. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982). Section 20 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
No... injunction shall be granted by any court of the United States... in any case
between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or be-
tween employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment,
involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employ-
ment ....
And no such.., injunction shall prohibit any person or persons, whether singly or in
concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform
any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peace-
ful means so to do; or from attending at any place where any such person or persons
may lawfiflly be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating informa-
tion, or from peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain from working;
or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recom-
mending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or
from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person engaged in such dispute,
any strike benefits or other moneys or things of value; or from peaceably assembling
in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which
might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto; nor shall
any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be in violations of
any law of the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
102. In fact, the Clayton Act was the result of more than two decades of congressional
efforts to reverse judicial application of the Sherman Act to labor unions. See Hoffmann, supra
note 12, at 21 n.97. For a further discussion of the Clayton Act see I T. KHEEL, supra note 76,
§ 4.02[2]-[3], at 40-61.
103. See 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 76, § 4.02[2][a], at 40.
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1. Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act
Section 6 expressly forbade federal courts from construing the Sher-
man Act so as to prohibit the existence and operation of labor unions."°
Furthermore, section 6 prohibited federal courts from construing the
Sherman Act so as to prevent union members from carrying out legiti-
mate union objectives.10 Finally, section 6 declared that no union or its
members could be construed as illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade under the Sherman Act. 106
Section 20 prohibited federal courts from issuing injunctions "in any
case between an employer and employees, or between employers and em-
ployees, or between employees, or between persons employed and per-
sons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a [labor]
dispute."'1 7 Under section 20, injunctions could only be issued under
very limited circumstances. 08
In addition to limiting the availability of injunctive relief, section 20
of the Clayton Act legitimized strikes, boycotts, and picketing, 0 9 ex-
pressly exempting those legitimate union activities from the Sherman
Act.110 However, section 20 established limitations on a union's right to
claim the exemption. Under section 20, a union had to act in a lawful
manner.'I' Thus, the Clayton Act appeared to be a victory for labor.
12
The victory, however, was short-lived.
2. Judicial interpretation of the Clayton Act
In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, I3 the Supreme Court grap-
pled with the application of sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act to labor
unions. In Duplex Printing, the International Association of Machinists
104. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982). Section 20 of the Clayton Act defines a "labor dispute" as one
involving "terms or conditions of employment." Id. It has been commonly assumed that the
Clayton Act overruled Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). See Handler & Zifchak, supra
note 88, at 470 n.60.
108. Injunctions could be issued to "prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property
right... for which there is no adequate remedy at law." 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
109. Id.
110. Id. The last clause in section 20 provides, "nor shall any of the acts specified in this
paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States." Id.
111. Id.
112. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 804 (1945) ("[The Clay-
ton] Act was broadly proclaimed by many as labor's Magna Carta."); see also, A. MASON,
supra note 74, at 170 (quoting Samuel Gompers as describing section 6 as "Labor's Magna
Charta" and section 20 as "Labor's Bill of Rights.").
113. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
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(the Union), composed of employees working for various New York
newspaper publishers, organized a boycott.114 The boycott targeted the
shipment, purchase, use, repair, and installation of printing presses man-
ufactured by the Duplex Printing Press Company (the Company), lo-
cated in Michigan. 15 The purpose of this secondary boycott 116 was to
aid unionization efforts by the Company's employees.
17 The Court' 18
held that notwithstanding the recent passage of the Clayton Act, the
Union violated the Sherman Act.' 19
The Court adopted a rather narrow construction of sections 6120 and
20121 of the Clayton Act. First, the Court declared that the Union's sec-
ondary boycott, irrespective of the Union's intent,122 was not a legitimate
union objective as contemplated by section 6.123 Thus, the Union's sec-
ondary boycott was not protected by the Clayton Act.124 Second, and
more importantly, the Court concluded that Congress intended section
20 to be narrowly construed, applying only to "labor disputes" involving
employers and their employees.125 Thus, because Union members were
boycotting a Company that was not their own employer, the Court found
that the Clayton Act offered the Union no protection from the Sherman
Act.
1 26
In his dissent, Justice Brandeis127 lashed out at the majority for
what he believed was an unwarranted, restrictive interpretation of section
114. Id. at 462-64.
115. Id.
116. See supra note 90 for the definition of secondary boycott.
117. Duplex Printing, 254 U.S. at 462-64.
118. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 460.
119. Id. at 468-79.
120. See supra note 100 for the text of section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982).
121. See supra note 101 for the text of section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
122. The Union had attempted to obtain a closed shop agreement as well as an eight hour
work day and a union wage scale. Duplex Printing, 254 U.S. at 462.
123. Id. at 469.
124. Id. at 468-69.
125. Id. at 471-76. In this respect, the Court stated:
Section 20 must be given full effect according to its terms as an expression of the
purpose of Congress; but it must be borne in mind that the section imposes an excep-
tional and extraordinary restriction upon the ... operation of the anti-trust laws....
and it would violate rules of statutory construction... to enlarge that [restriction]
... by resorting to a loose construction of the section .... [Thus, the section only
applies] to those who are proximately and substantially concerned as parties to an
actual dispute respecting the terms or conditions of their own employment, past,
present, or prospective.
Id. at 471-72. This narrow interpretation of section 20 was later rejected by Congress in 1932
in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982). See infra notes 132-41 and accom-
panying text.
126. Duplex Printing, 254 U.S. at 478.
127. Justice Brandeis was joined by Justices Holmes and Clarke. Id. at 479.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:151
20.128 Justice Brandeis reasoned that section 20 of the Clayton Act pro-
tected legitimate labor union activities arising out of a "labor dispute,"
irrespective of whether the employees involved were actual employees of
the targeted employer.129 Thus, Justice Brandeis concluded that section
20 applied to the Union's secondary boycott, thereby exempting the
Union from the Sherman Act.
130
In effect, Duplex Printing established that the status of union activ-
ity under the Sherman Act remained unchanged, despite the passage of
the Clayton Act. The Supreme Court and lower federal courts consist-
ently reaffirmed this position throughout the post-Clayton Act period.
13 1
B. The Norris-LaGuardia Act: A Congressional Response
Continued judicial application of the Sherman Act to labor unions
coupled with a judicial failure to implement the clearly defined labor ex-
emption of the Clayton Act prompted Congress to enact the Norris-La-
Guardia Anti-Injunction Act of 1932.132 The purpose of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act was to "protect the rights of labor in the same manner
the Congress intended when it enacted the Clayton Act, ... which act,
by reason of its construction and application by the Federal courts [was]
ineffectual to accomplish the congressional intent." '133 In other words,
128. Id. at 487-88 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
129. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis stated:
Congress did not restrict the provision to employers and workingmen in their employ.
By including "employers and employees" and "persons employed and persons seek-
ing employment" it showed that it was not aiming merely at a legal relationship
between a specific employer and his employees. Furthermore,... [i]f the words are
to receive a strict technical construction, the statute will have no application to dis-
putes between employers of labor and workingmen, since the very acts to which it
applies sever the continuity of the legal relationship.
Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). However, this position was not adopted
by Congress until 1932 in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982). See infra
notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
130. Duplex Printing, 254 U.S. at 487-88 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
131. See, eg., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37
(1927) (union's primary boycott held to violate Sherman Act); Coronado Coal Co. v. UMW,
268 U.S. 295 (1925) (strike over employer's establishment of non-union facility held to violate
Sherman Act); American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184
(1921) (union picketing held to violate Sherman Act); see also 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 76,
§ 4.02[3], at 53 n.73 (court decisions narrowly construing §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act).
132. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982). For a further discussion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
see 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 76, § 4.03[l]-[4], at 62-104.
133. H.R. Rep. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932). The Supreme Court in United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), stated that the "aim of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
was to restore the broad purpose which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton Act
but which was frustrated.., by unduly restrictive judicial construction." Id. at 235-36; see
also Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 100-03 (1940)
(discussion of legislative purpose behind Norris-LaGuardia Act).
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the Norris-LaGuardia Act sought to restrict federal judicial intervention
in "labor disputes."' 34
The Norris-LaGuardia Act established a national policy'35 legiti-
mizing an employee's right to organize, as well as a union's right to pur-
sue its objectives through collective bargaining.'36 Furthermore, the
Norris-LaGuardia Act severely curtailed the federal courts' jurisdiction
over controversies involving or growing out of a "labor dispute."' 37 In
this regard, Congress adopted the broad definition of "labor dispute" ad-
134. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw: THE BOARDS, THE COURTS AND THE NA-
TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 22 (Morris ed. 1971) [hereinafter LABOR LAW].
135. Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act established the following as the public policy of
the United States:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions . . . the individual unorganized
worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his
freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employ-
ment, wherefore ... it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the
terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the interfer-
ence, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor.., in the designation of such
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
29 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). Congress rbiterated this public policy favoring collective bargaining
and union organization when it passed the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act in 1935, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982); see infra notes 173-86 and accompanying text.
136. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). Collective bargaining has been described as "a procedure
looking toward the making of a collective agreement between the employer and the accredited
representative of his employees concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of employ-
ment." NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 1941); see section 8(d) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). The NLRA imposes a duty of good
faith bargaining on both the employer and the union. See id.
137. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any.., injunction in
any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or
persons participating or interested in such dispute... from doing, whether singly or
in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any em-
ployer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described in
section 3 of this Act;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or inter-
ested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance, or
other moneys or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any
labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or suit
in any court of the United States or of any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dis-
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vocated by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Duplex Printing.13 Section
13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the associa-
tion or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, main-
taining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee. 39
Hence, under the Norris-LaGuardia Act a "labor dispute" existed re-
gardless of whether an employer-employee relationship existed.
Congress, in passing the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, pro-
vided an unambiguous exemption from the Sherman Act for legitimate
labor union activities. However, not until Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader 140
did the Court begin to give credence to Congress' desire to exempt from
pute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not in-
volving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the act here-
tofore specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore
specified; and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or vio-
lence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as
is described in section 3 of this Act.
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1982).
Moreover, § 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
No Court of the United States... shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a
labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this Act; nor shall
any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary
to the public policy declared in this Act.
29 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
Finally, § 5 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
No Court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction upon the ground that any of the persons partici-
pating or interested in a labor dispute constitute or are engaged in an unlawful com-
bination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of the acts enumerated in
section 4 of this Act.
29 U.S.C. § 105 (1982).
However, federal courts may issue injunctions involving or growing out of a "labor dis-
pute" in very limited circumstances. See § 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107
(1982).
138. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1982) (emphasis added). The Norris-LaGuardia Act's definition
of "labor dispute" is similar to that found in § 20 of the Clayton Act. See supra note 101; see
also § 2(9) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1982) (defining "labor
dispute" essentially the same as that found in Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts).
140. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
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the Sherman Act legitimate labor union activities.'4 1
C. The Turning Point: Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader
Eight years after the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Justice
Stone, 42 writing for the majority in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,143 estab-
lished the foundation for a new direction in labor-antitrust law.
44
1. The facts
The Apex Hosiery Company (the Company) manufactured hosiery
at its factory in Philadelphia. 45 The Company employed about 2500
workers; eight were union members."4 In April 1937, the American
Federation of Full Fashioned Hosiery Workers (the Union), demanded a
closed shop agreement' 47 from the Company.14 8  The Company re-
fused.' 49 On May 4, 1937, the Union ordered a strike at the Company's
Philadelphia factory. 5 Two days later, Union members, most of whom
were employed at various factories around the area, gathered at the
Company's plant. 5 ' William Leader, President of the Union, again de-
manded a closed shop agreement from the Company.'52 Again, the
Company refused. 5 3 Subsequently, a sit-down strike began.' 5 4 During
the strike, Union members violently destroyed the Company's manufac-
turing equipment.' 55 The Company brought suit against the Union and
its officials, claiming that the Union's actions constituted a restraint of
141. Although Apex Hosiery did not specifically involve the question of a labor exemption,
see infra note 161, the decision is important because it marks a significant turning point. In
Apex Hosiery, the Court began to reexamine the interplay between labor unions and the Sher-
man Act. See generally, Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 483-513.
142. Justice Stone was appointed Chief Justice by President Roosevelt in 1941. See C.
DUCAT & H. CHASE, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONN 1616 (3d ed. 1983).
143. 310 U.S. 469 (1940). For a further discussion of Apex Hosiery see Hoffmann, supra
note 12, at 4-9.
144. In Apex Hosiery, the Court reexamined the interplay between labor unions and the
Sherman Act. See generally Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 483-513. This seemed appropriate in
light of numerous congressional actions aimed at promoting unionization and stabilizing work-
ing conditions in the labor market. See A. Cox, D. BoK & R. GoRMAN, supra note 90, at 62.
145. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 480.
146. Id. at 481.
147. See supra note 81 for the definition of closed shop agreement.
148. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 481.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 56
2. The holding
On the surface, Justice Stone's opinion in Apex Hosiery held that the
Union's violent sit-down strike did not violate the Sherman Act. 157 But
in his opinion Justice Stone also defined the scope of the Sherman Act.158
Justice Stone concluded that the Sherman Act prohibited only conduct
that substantially interfered with the commercial market. 159 Moreover,
Justice Stone made it clear that union conduct aimed at eliminating com-
petition in the labor market was not prohibited by the Sherman Act."6
Justice Stone did not base his decision on the express labor exemp-
tion created by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. Rather, he re-
lied on his understanding of the ultimate purpose and scope of the
Sherman Act. 61 For Justice Stone, the Sherman Act reached conduct
156. Id. at 480-81. See supra note 79 for the text of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1982).
157. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 512-13.
158. Id. at 492-501.
159. Id. at 495. More specifically, the Sherman Act prohibited only conduct that "re-
strict[ed] production, raise[d] prices, or otherwise control[led] the market to the detriment of
... consumers .... " Id. at 493.
160. Id. at 502-04. Justice Stone stated:
Since the enactment of the declaration in § 6 of the Clayton Act that "the labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce... nor shall such [labor]
organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combina-
tions or conspiracies in the restraint of trade under the antitrust laws," it would seem
plain that restraints on the sale of the employee's services to the employer, however
much they curtail the competition among employees, are not in themselves combina-
tions or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce under the Sherman Act.
Strikes or agreements not to work, entered into by laborers to compel employers
to yield to their demands, may restrict to some extent the power of employers who
are parties to the dispute to compete in the market with those not subject to such
demands .... [However,] the mere fact of such restrictions on competition does not
in itself bring the parties to the agreement within the condemnation of the Sherman
Act.... Furthermore, successful union activity... may have some influence on
price competition by eliminating that part of such competition which is based on
differences in labor standards.... [However, the] elimination of price competition
based on differences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor organiza-
tion. But this effect on competition has not been considered to be the kind of curtail-
ment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act.
Id.
Based on his review of the national labor laws, Justice Stone concluded, "[t]his series of
acts clearly recognizes that combinations of workers eliminating competition among them-
selves and restricting competition among their employers based on wage cutting are not con-
trary to the public policy." Id. at 504 n.24.
161. Id. at 495, 500; see also Handler, Reforming the Antitrust Laws, 82 COLUM. L. REv.
1287, 1341 (1982). Some courts and commentators have suggested that Justice Stone's opinion
carved out a nonstatutory exemption from the Sherman Act for labor unions. See, e.g., Al-
temose Constr. Co. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 751 F.2d 653, 659 (3d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1107 (1976); Mid-America Regional Bargaining Ass'n v. Will County
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aimed only at eliminating competition in the commercial market.'62
This conclusion was consistent with Congress' intent in enacting the
Sherman Act.'63 Congress, in passing the Sherman Act, had sought to
restrain only anticompetitive abuses in the commercial market. 64 By
limiting the scope of the Sherman Act to conduct aimed at eliminating
competition in the commercial market, Justice Stone recognized the true
underlying purpose for which the Sherman Act was meant to apply.' 6
Under Justice Stone's reasoning, union liability under the Sherman
Act turned on whether the union pursued its objectives through the elim-
ination of competition in the commercial market or through the elimina-
tion of competition in the labor market. The former conduct was
prohibited under the Sherman Act, while the latter conduct was beyond
the scope of the Sherman Act.
Applying this standard to the facts of the Apex Hosiery case, Justice
Carpenters Dist. Council, 675 F.2d 881, 890 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982);
Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 513 (3d Cir. 1979),
vacated on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980); see also Note, From Norris-La Guardia to Con-
nell-Consistency Yields Comprehensive Labor Antitrust Protection, 17 NEw ENG. L. REv. 845,
860 (1982) ("What set the decision in Apex apart from all prior labor antitrust decisions was
the Court's recognition that the goals and activities of organized labor may qualify for a non-
statutory exemption.").
The language in Justice Stone's opinion really does not suggest the creation of an exemp-
tion. Rather, Justice Stone held that the Sherman Act prohibited only conduct aimed at elimi-
nating competition in the commercial market. Conduct aimed at eliminating competition in
the labor market was beyond the scope of the Sherman Act, not merely exempt from the Act.
Thus, the Union's conduct in Apex Hosiery was entirely beyond the scope of the Sherman Act.
See St. Antoine, supra note 75, at 606; Handler, supra, at 1340 n.332 ("Some courts and com-
mentators have cited Apex as the seminal opinion in the development of... the 'nonstatutory'
exemption .... This is unfortunate, in that Apex had portrayed conduct affecting labor mar-
ket competition as not merely exempt but entirely beyond the substantive scope of the Sherman
Act.") (emphasis in original); see also California Dump Truck Owners Ass'n v. Associated
Gen. Contractors, 562 F.2d 607, 611 (9th Cir. 1977) (properly tracing origins of nonstatutory
exemption to Local No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965)).
162. Justice Stone cited three reasons in support of his conclusion. First, Congress' com-
merce power under the Sherman Act was at its greatest only when Congress prevented re-
straints in the commercial market. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 495. Second, Justice Stone
observed that the Court had never applied the Sherman Act unless there was some restraint on
the commercial market. Id. Finally, the Court had never applied the Sherman Act unless the
restraint on the commercial market was substantial. Id. at 495-97.
163. See supra notes 12-74 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 44-74 and accompanying text. Justice Stone did, however, recognize
that a union's pursuit of legitimate goals might create restraints on the commercial market.
Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 503. He nevertheless concluded that such restraints were not the
type the Sherman Act intended to proscribe. Id.
165. See supra notes 12-74 and accompanying text.
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Stone concluded that the Union's strike, regardless of its illegality, 166 did
not violate the Sherman Act.1 67 There was no evidence that the Union
intended to affect prices in the commercial market.168 Justice Stone
stated:
Here it is plain that the combination or conspiracy did not have
as its purpose restraint upon competition in the market for peti-
tioner's product. Its object was to compel petitioner to accede
to the union demands and an effect of it, in consequence of the
strikers' tortious acts, was the prevention of the removal of pe-
titioner's product for interstate shipment. So far as appears the
delay of these shipments was not intended to have and had no
effect on prices of hosiery in the market ....169
Thus, under Apex Hosiery, a union could pursue traditional objectives,
such as better wages, hours and working conditions, so long as the union
did not attempt to directly interfere or restrain the commercial mar-
ket. 170 However, a union that sought to suppress competition in the
commercial market would violate the Sherman Act.71
IV. THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL LABOR LAWS
To fully understand the development of labor's exemptions from the
Sherman Act, 72 a brief review of the major labor law legislation is essen-
tial. This section focuses on the National Labor Relations Act, and its
subsequent amendments, the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hart-
ley) Act and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Lan-
drum-Griffing) Act.
A. The National Labor Relations Act
The purpose behind the Clayton 173 and Norris-LaGuardia 174 Acts
166. Justice Stone noted, "[i]t is not denied... [that the union] violated the civil and penal
laws of Pennsylvania .. . ." Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 483.
167. Id. at 501.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Some commentators have suggested that further refinement of the Apex Hosiery doc-
trine would have been the soundest course for the Court to take in dealing with labor unions
under the Sherman Act. See St. Antoine, supra note 75, at 607.
171. Labor unions that combine with non-labor groups in an effort to eliminate competition
in the commercial market are subject to the Sherman Act. See supra note 48 and accompany-
ing text.
172. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). See infra notes 216-391 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion on labor's statutory and nonstatutory exemptions.
173. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1982). See supra notes 99-131 and
accompanying text.
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was to restrict federal courts' ability to issue injunctions in controversies
growing or arising out of a "labor dispute." '175 This restriction would
allow unions to pursue legitimate objectives without undue judicial inter-
ference. The National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act (NLRA),'76 was
passed in an effort to further promote the growth of organized labor and
the development of collective bargaining.'77 Section 7,178 at the heart of
the NLRA, gave employees affirmative rights to organize, to bargain col-
lectively and to engage in concerted activities in support of these
rights. 1
9
Moreover, the NLRA established a scheme to protect employees'
section 7 rights. 8 ' Section 8 of the NLRA prohibited certain employer
practices aimed at obstructing section 7 rights.' 8 ' For instance, section 8
prohibited employers from interfering, restraining or coercing employees'
exercise of their section 7 rights.'82 Section 8 also prohibited employers
from giving assistance to or dominating a favored union,'83 from discrim-
inating against employees on the basis of union affiliation'8 4 and from
refusing to bargain with employees' representatives.' Finally, Congress
created a new agency empowered to implement and enforce the provi-
174. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982). See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 99-112, 132-41 and accompanying text.
176. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). For a further discussion of the National Labor Relations
Act see LABOR LAW, supra note 134, at 1-34. See also A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR POLICY (1960); 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 76, § 5.01[1]-[4], at 5-89. The constitutionality
of the NLRA was upheld by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
177. While it is true that the Norris-LaGuardia Act attempted to promote the growth of
organized labor, see supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text, it made very little progress in
this respect. See LABOR LAW, supra note 134, at 25.
178. Section 7 of the NLRA provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor orga-
nizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as author-
ized in section 8(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982) (italicized text added pursuant to Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-197 (1982)).
179. Id. The right to strike was also affirmatively acknowledged. See § 13 of the NLRA,
29 U.S.C. § 163 (1982).
180. See § 8 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
181. A violation of § 8 constitutes an unfair labor practice. The National Labor Relations
Board has the power to remedy unfair labor practices. See infra note 186 and accompanying
text.
182. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
183. Id. § 158(a)(2).
184. Id. § 158(a)(3).
185. Id. § 158(a)(5).
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sions of the NLRA-the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).' 86
1. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act
By 1947, the balance of power had shifted dramatically from em-
ployers to labor unions. 187 One commentator described the labor move-
ment of the late 1940s as the "largest, the most powerful, and the most
aggressive that the world has ever seen; and the strongest unions... are
the most powerful private economic organizations in the country."'' 18
This unprecedented shift in power prompted Congress to amend the
NLRA by passing the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act
in 1947.189
Under the Taft-Hartley Act, unions were subject to similar prohibi-
tions imposed against employers under the original NLRA. Among
other things, Taft-Hartley imposed on unions a duty to bargain, 190 pro-
hibited unions from coercing or intimidating employees with respect to
employees' organizational rights1 91 and prohibited unions from pressing
management into discriminating against employees with respect to their
organizational rights. 192 The Taft-Hartley Act also outlawed closed
shops. 193
Moreover, the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited certain secondary activi-
ties in which unions regularly engaged to put pressure on employers. 194
186. Id. §§ 153, 160.
187. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 90, at 89-93.
Between 1935 and 1947, unions, in the wake of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, flourished. See LABOR LAW, supra note 134, at 35. During this
time period union membership increased from three to fifty million. Id. Along with this
growth in numbers came increasing power for labor leaders. During World War 11, for exam-
ple, union leaders were given important and prestigious positions in the federal government.
Id. These leaders were frequently consulted by the Roosevelt Administration in an attempt to
maintain internal industrial peace. Id. In accord with this new found power, labor leaders
constantly caused unions to engage in crippling strikes in important industries. Id. Against
this backdrop, Congress sought to even the balance of power between employers and unions.
188. S. SLICHTER, THE CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 154 (1947).
189. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982). For a further discussion on the Taft-Hartley Act see
LABOR LAW, supra note 134, at 35-48. See also Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947 (pts. 1 & 2), 61 HARV. L. REv. 1, 274 (1947); 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 76,
§ 5.02[1]-[3], at 90-154. The Taft-Hartley Act was bitterly opposed by labor unions, and
passed over President Truman's veto. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 90, at
89; LABOR LAW, supra note 134, at 39 (contents of President Truman's message on veto of
Taft-Hartley).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1982).
191. Id. § 158(b)(1).
192. Id. § 158(b)(2).
193. Id. §§ 158(a)(3), (b)(2); see also supra note 81.
194. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A)-(D) (1982).
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For example, under section 8(b)(4), unions, that pursued certain unlaw-
ful objectives were prohibited from inducing or encouraging employees
of secondary employers to strike or refuse to handle goods or perform
services. 195 However, the Taft-Hartley Act permitted unions and secon-
dary employers to voluntarily enter into agreements,1 96 allowing the sec-
ondary employers to boycott primary employers with whom the unions
had disputes. 197
2. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
(Landrum-Griffin) Act
The major impetus behind the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959198 was to protect union mem-
bers from improper union conduct.19 9 Senate investigations in the late
1950s"° revealed substantial corruption in the internal operations of
some of the largest unions in the country.0 1 Congress sought to control
this corruption by passing the Landrum-Griffin Act, another amendment
to the NLRA.
The Landrum-Griffin Act was composed of several introductory
sections20 2 and seven titles.20 Most of the Landrum-Griffin Act dealt
with the internal regulation of labor unions.2' However, the Landrum-
Griffin Act also closed certain loopholes left open by Taft-Hartley's sec-
ondary boycott provisions. 205 Further, the Landrum-Griflin Act prohib-
195. Id.
196. These agreements are known as hot cargo agreements. See infra note 358. Congress
outlawed hot cargo agreements in 1959, with the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L.
No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). See 29
U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982). However, certain hot cargo agreements are allowed in the construc-
tion and garment industries. See infra note 378.
197. See Handler & Zifchak, supra note 88, at 473.
198. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C.). For a further discussion on the Landrum-Griffin Act see LABOR LAW, supra note
134, at 49-59. See also Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 44 MmN. L. REv. 257 (1959); 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 76, § 5.03[1]-[3], at 155-80.
199. See 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 76, § 5.03[1], at 155.
200. Senate investigation committees, such as the McClellan Committee, began investigat-
ing union corruption in 1957. Id. at 155 n.2, 159-60.
201. Id. at 155.
202. See §§ 2-3 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-402 (1982).
203. Title I consists of §§ 101-105, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1982); Title II consists of §§ 201-
211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-441 (1982); Title III consists of §§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C. 461-466 (1982);
Title IV consists of §§ 401-404, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-484 (1982); Title V consists of §§ 501-505, 29
U.S.C. §§ 501-504, 186(a)-(c) (1982); Title VI consists of §§ 601-611, 29 U.S.C. §§ 521-531
(1982); Title VII, which contains the Taft-Hartley amendments, is codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-144, 151-168, 185-188 (1982).
204. Id. See also 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 76, § 5.03[3], at 170-75.
205. See National Woodwork Mfgs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 633-43 (1967).
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ited hot cargo agreements,2 °6 except in the construction industry and
garment industry. 0 7
B. Summary of Labor Laws
The National Labor Relations Act created and firmly established
specific organizational rights for employees. 20 8 Moreover, the NLRA ex-
pressly prohibited certain employer activities aimed at obstructing the
newly established rights.209 The subsequent amendments to the NLRA
placed affirmative duties on unions not to engage in conduct obstructing
employees' organizational rights and outlawed various union secondary
activities. °10 Under the NLRA, union or employer conduct constituted
an unfair labor practice when such conduct obstructed employees' orga-
nizational rights. 211 The NLRA encompassed a comprehensive scheme
implemented and regulated by the National Labor Relations Board, to
remedy unfair labor practices.
Thus, with the passage of the national labor laws, the right to union-
ize and to bargain collectively had become codified as part of the nation's
public policy.2 12 To uphold the commands of this newly created national
labor policy, it was necessary to protect the rights afforded labor from
undue restriction under the antitrust laws. The problem, however, is
that the antitrust laws are inherently incompatible with the goals of
organized labor.213  Antitrust laws seek to preserve compet-
206. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982). See infra note 378 for the text of section 158(e).
207. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982) (construction industry and garment industry proviso). See
infra note 378 for the text of the construction industry proviso.
208. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
209. Id. § 158.
210. See generally Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982); Landrum-Griffin Act,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
211. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
212. Section 1 of the NLRA states in pertinent part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); see also supra note 135 (similar public policy announcement contained
in section 2 of Norris-LaGuardia Act).
213. Dean St. Antoine has stated:
From the outset, the difficulty in applying the antitrust concept to organized
labor has been that the two are intrinsically incompatible. The antitrust laws are
designed to promote competition, and unions, avowedly and unabashedly, are
designed to limit it. According to classical trade union theory, the objective is the
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ition,214 whereas labor unions seek to limit competition. 215 To resolve
this conflict, courts have recognized labor's exemptions from the Sher-
man Act. Without such recognition, the public policies enunciated
under the national labor laws would be frustrated.
V. THE MODERN ANALYSIS FOR THE LABOR-ANTITRUST PROBLEM:
THE STATUTORY AND NONSTATUTORY LABOR
EXEMPTIONS
To determine whether the Sherman Act 2 6 is applicable to union
conduct, courts apply a bifurcated analysis: the statutory and nonstatu-
tory exemptions.217 The statutory exemption applies to those unilateral
union activities expressly exempt from injunction under the Clayton218
and Norris-LaGuardia2 9 Acts.220 However, the statutory exemption
does not apply to controversies arising from the terms or the enforcement
of union-employer agreements.221 Rather, courts have created a more
limited nonstatutory exemption applicable to union-employer agree-
ments.222 Applying the nonstatutory exemption involves a judicial bal-
ance between the competing policies underlying the national labor laws
and those underlying the antitrust laws.223 This section reviews the ma-
jor Supreme Court cases that recognized, defined and applied the statu-
tory and nonstatutory exemptions.
A. The Statutory Exemption: Labor's Immunization from the
Sherman Act
Shortly after Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,224 the Supreme Court de-
elimination of wage competition among all employees doing the same job in the same
industry. Logically extended, the policy against restraint of trade must condemn the
very existence of labor organizations, since their minimum aim has always been the
suppression of any inclination on the part of working people to offer their services to
employers at different prices.
St. Antoine, supra note 75, at 604 (footnotes omitted).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
217. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-
22 (1975); Sun-Land Nurseries, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council, 793 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th
Cir. 1986) (en bane), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1299 (1987); Granddad Bread, Inc. v. Continental
Baking Co., 612 F.2d 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981).
218. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1982).
219. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
220. See ANTRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (SECOND) 620-23 (1984).
221. Id. at 623.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. 310 U.S. 469 (1940); see supra notes 140-71 and accompanying text.
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cided United States v. Hutcheson.22 The Hutcheson Court finally recog-
nized what Congress had attempted since the passage of the Sherman
Act-that legitimate labor union activities were exempt from the Sher-
man Act's prohibitions.226 This exemption is known as labor's statutory
exemption. The statutory exemption protects those unilateral union ac-
tivities that are immune from injunction under the Clayton and Norris-
LaGuardia Acts.
1. United States v. Hutcheson
a. the facts
In Hutcheson,227 a dispute arose at the Anheuser-Busch Brewing
Company plant in St. Louis.228 The United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America (the Carpenters) and the International Associa-
tion of Machinists (the Machinists) were among those unions represent-
ing employees at the plant.229 Trouble began when the employer gave
the Machinists the responsibility for erecting and dismantling certain
equipment.230 Believing that the work should have been assigned to their
union, officials for the Carpenters organized a strike at the employer's
plant.2 3' In addition, the Carpenters called a strike against certain con-
struction companies that were hired by the employer to expand its facili-
ties.232 The Carpenters also organized a boycott of Anheuser-Busch beer
among union members and friends.233 The federal government filed
criminal antitrust charges234 against the Carpenters alleging that the
Carpenters' actions constituted a combination and conspiracy in restraint
of trade in violation of section 1235 of the Sherman Act.3 6
225. 312 U.S. 219 (1941); see infra notes 227-56 and accompanying text; see also C. GREG-
ORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 269-79 (2d rev. ed. 1958) for a discussion of the case.
226. See supra notes 25-74 and accompanying text.
227. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
228. Id. at 227-28.




233. Id. at 227-28.
234. The antitrust laws may be enforced through government initiated proceedings for
criminal sanctions or equitable relief, or private suits for injunctive relief or treble damages.
See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrRusr LAW 26 (1978). The antitrust division of the
United States Justice Department is responsible for bringing federal criminal prosecutions
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 27. There is no criminal liability for viola-
tions of the Clayton Act. Id. For a more detailed discussion of antitrust enforcement see id. at
26-44.
235. See supra note 79 for the text of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
236. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 228.
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b. the holding
Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter recognized the exist-
ence of labor's statutory exemption from the Sherman Act.237 Justice
Frankfurter, after acknowledging Congress' efforts to exempt legitimate
labor union activities from the Sherman Act,238 determined that the
Sherman, Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts must be read together as
"interlacing statutes" before a court could determine whether union con-
duct violated the Sherman Act.239 In this regard, Justice Frankf'urter
concluded that union conduct that could not be enjoined under the Clay-
ton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts (conduct involving or growing out of a
"labor dispute"), 4' could not be reached by the Sherman Act.
241
Justice Frankfurter defined labor's statutory exemption broadly,
stating:
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 [of the
Clayton Act] are not to be distinguished by any judgment re-
garding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness,
the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particu-
lar union activities are the means.242
In effect, Justice Frankfurter created a two-pronged analysis for deter-
mining whether labor's statutory exemption was applicable. First, the
237. Id. at 229-32.
238. Id. at 229-31.
239. Id. at 231-32. Specifically, Justice Frankfurter stated: "whether trade union conduct
constitutes a violation of the Sherman Law is to be determined only by reading the Sherman
Law and § 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a harmonizing text of
outlawry of labor conduct." Id. at 231. The Court made clear that conduct which cannot be
enjoined under the Norris-LaGuardia Act cannot be prosecuted under the Sherman Act. Id
at 236.
240. See supra notes 107, 137-39 and accompanying text.
241. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 236. Justice Frankfurter stated:
The Norris-LaGuardia Act reasserted the original purpose of the Clayton Act by
infusing into it the immunized trade union activities as redefined by the later Act. In
this light § 20 removes all such allowable conduct from the taint of being a "violation
of any law of the United States," including the Sherman Law.
Id. In concurrence, Justice Stone, who authored the Apex Hosiery opinion, 310 U.S. 469
(1940), thought that the Court went too far by interpreting the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia
Acts. Id. at 237 (Stone, J., concurring). For Justice Stone, it was enough to say that the
Union's activities were outside the scope of the Sherman Act. Id. (Stone, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 232 (footnote omitted). Justice Frankfurter recognized that, in the wake of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, it made little sense to rely on the earlier labor-antitrust cases. Id. at
236. Commentators have suggested that the Court's opinion in Hutcheson overruled Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen
Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927). See Handler, supra note 161, at 1340; see also supra
notes 113-31 and accompanying text.
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union's conduct must fall within the statutory definition of "labor dis-
pute."243 Second, the union must "act alone" and not in combination
with "non-labor groups." 2' According to Justice Frankfurter, satisfac-
tion of both prongs triggered the statutory exemption.
This result was in full accord with Congress' intent. First, Con-
gress, in passing the Sherman Act, never intended to punish a union's
pursuit of legitimate objectives.245 It was only a union's combination
with non-labor groups to restrict competition in the commercial market
that triggered application of the Sherman Act.246 Second, and perhaps
more importantly, Congress, in passing the Clayton and Norris-LaGuar-
dia Acts, sought to limit courts from interfering in "labor disputes.""24
However, these judicial limitations would be meaningless if they could be
circumvented indirectly by way of the Sherman Act. By holding that the
existence of a "labor dispute" could preclude the application of the Sher-
man Act, Justice Frankfurter foreclosed any such possibility.24
Applying this rationale to the case, Justice Frankfurter concluded
that the Carpenters' conduct involved a "labor dispute," and was thus
immune from injunction.249 Since the Carpenters' conduct was statuto-
rily protected from injunction under the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia
Acts, their conduct was exempt from prosecution under the Sherman
Act.
2 50
243. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 230-37. See I T. KHEEL, supra note 76, § 4.04[3], at 133 &
n. 117.
244. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 230-37. See 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 76, § 4.04[3], at 133 &
n.118. The second prong ("act alone") was treated much more extensively by the Court in
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), see infra notes 257-81 and
accompanying text. In Hutcheson, however, Justice Frankfurter's opinion implied that unions
would be stripped of antitrust immunity if they combined with nonlabor groups. In Hutche-
son, Justice Frankfurter referred to United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926), as an example
of the type of union-employer combination needed for a union to forfeit statutory protection.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232 n.3. Brims involved manufacturers, building contractors and
union carpenters who conspired to eliminate competition by nonunion mills. Brims, 272 U.S.
at 551-52. Such a combination was obviously not present in the Hutcheson case; thus, Justice
Frankfurter did not directly address the issue. However, Justice Frankfurter's opinion is sig-
nificant, in that it suggests that unions will be stripped of statutory immunity only when they
engage in concerted action in the antitrust sense; that is, when they adopt an employers' anti-
trust animus.
245. Although Congress' intent may have been unclear when it passed the Sherman Act, see
supra note 47, any ambiguities were quickly resolved when Congress subsequently passed the
Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. See supra notes 99-141 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 99-112, 132-39 and accompanying text.
248. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 234-37.
249. Id. at 234.
250. The United States argued that despite the fact federal courts lacked jurisdiction to
issue an injunction under the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, the Carpenters were still
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c. union status under Hutcheson
Under Hutcheson, the application of the statutory exemption turns
on whether the union conduct in question comes within the scope of a
"labor dispute," as defined by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia
Acts.2"' If a labor dispute exists, the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia
Acts will prevent the federal courts from issuing an injunction.252 If no
injunction could issue under the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts,
the conduct is statutorily exempt from the Sherman Act.2 53 The Hutche-
son Court, however, only dealt with the statutory exemption in the con-
text of unilateral union conduct. 254 The Court did not address whether
the statutory exemption applied to controversies arising from the terms
or the enforcement of union-employer agreements.255 This issue, how-
ever, arose four years after Hutcheson, in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No.
subject to criminal prosecution under the Sherman Act. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 234. Justice
Frankfurter rejected this argument:
It would be strange indeed that although neither the Government nor Anheuser-
Busch could have sought an injunction against the acts here challenged, the elaborate
efforts to permit such conduct failed to prevent criminal liability punishable with
imprisonment and heavy fines. That is not the way to read the will of Congress,
particularly when expressed by a statute which, as we have already indicated, is prac-
tically and historically one of a series of enactments touching one of the most sensi-
tive national problems. Such legislation must not be read in a spirit of mutilating
narrowness. On matters far less vital and far less interrelated we have had occasion
to point out the importance of giving "hospitable scope" to Congressional purpose
even when meticulous words are lacking.
Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
Shortly after Hutcheson, the Court, in a per curiam decision, upheld the district court's
application of the statutory exemption to a musician's union. See United States v. American
Fed'n of Musicians, 47 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ill. 1942), aff'd per curiam, 318 U.S. 741 (1943);
see also United States v. Carrozzo, 37 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
International Hod Carriers Council, 313 U.S. 539 (1941).
251. See supra notes 237-50 and accompanying text. A section 1 Sherman Act violation
requires a showing of two elements: a "contract, combination, or conspiracy," and, a "re-
straint of trade." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The Hutcheson Court dealt with the first element by
holding that a union that acts in its own self-interest and has not combined with nonlabor
groups is protected from the Sherman Act. The Apex Hosiery Court dealt with the second
element by holding that a party must prove that union conduct was aimed at eliminating
competition in the commercial market, and that this was not just an ancillary effect of the
elimination of competition in the labor market. The two cases must be read as together estab-
lishing the basis for labor-antitrust analysis. See 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 76, § 4.04[2], at 116.
252. See supra notes 107-08, 134, 137-39 and accompanying text.
253. Any other result would make little sense. It would be strange indeed if union conduct
protected under the national labor laws was prohibited under the antitrust laws.
254. Unilateral union conduct as used in this Comment refers to conduct not arising in the
context of a union-employer agreement.
255. The references to "union-employer agreements" throughout this Comment are meant
to include, unless otherwise indicated, those agreements dealing with wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment.
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3, IBEW.25 6
2. Defining the parameters of the statutory exemption: Allen Bradley
Co. v. Local No. 3, IBEW
Shortly after the Hutcheson Court recognized labor's statutory ex-
emption from the Sherman Act, the Court was asked to define the outer
parameters of this exemption in the context of both unilateral union con-
duct and union-employer agreements.
a the facts
In Allen Bradley, Local No. 3, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), had jurisdiction over electri-
cal workers in New York City.2" 7 Local No. 3 represented employees
who manufactured or installed electrical equipment.2"8 In an effort to
obtain more work and better working conditions for its members, Local
No. 3 waged a fierce campaign to obtain closed shop agreements259 with
New York City manufacturers and contractors in the electrical equip-
ment industry.26' Local No. 3 used such tactics as strikes and boy-
cotts. 261 These tactics proved highly successful, resulting in agreements
being reached between Local No. 3 and a variety of employers in the
electrical equipment industry.262 Under the agreements, contractors
agreed to purchase electrical equipment only from manufacturers that
had agreements with Local No. 3.263 Furthermore, manufacturers
agreed to sell electrical equipment only to contractors that employed
members of Local No. 3.24 Over time these agreements became industry
wide, concerning not only terms and conditions of employment, but also
price and market control.265 All parties to the agreements profited
greatly.
266
A group of electrical equipment manufacturers, located outside of
New York City, brought suit against Local No. 3.267 The suit alleged
that Local No. 3 had conspired with electrical contractors and manufac-
256. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
257. Id. at 799.
258. Id.
259. See supra note 81 for the definition of closed shop agreement.





265. Id. at 799-800.
266. Id. at 800.
267. Id. at 798-800.
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Justice Black, writing for the majority, began by recognizing the in-
herent conflict between the policies embodied in the national labor laws
and the antitrust laws.269 In an attempt to reconcile these two conflicting
policies, Justice Black concluded that a union must "act alone" and in its
"self-interest" to benefit from the statutory exemption.27 Justice Black
found that Local No. 3 violated the Sherman Act because it combined
with electrical manufacturers and contractors to monopolize the electri-
cal equipment industry in New York City.27 1 However, Justice Black
suggested that had Local No. 3 not participated in a conspiracy to
monopolize the industry, its conduct would have been protected by the
268. Id. at 798.
269. Id. at 806. Justice Black stated:
[There are] two declared congressional policies which it is our responsibility to try to
reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive business economy; the other to
preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions through the agency of
collective bargaining. We must determine here how far Congress intended activities
under one of these policies to neutralize the results envisioned by the other.
Id. Later in the opinion, Justice Black determined how far Congress had sought to proscribe
union activities under the Sherman Act. Justice Black stated:
There is, however, one line which we can draw with assurance that we follow the
congressional purpose. We know that Congress feared the concentrated power of
business organizations to dominate markets and prices. It intended to outlaw busi-
ness monopolies. A business monopoly is no less such because a union participates,
and such participation is a violation of the Act.
Id. at 811.
270. Id. at 807-11. Justice Black stated that, "[olur holding means that the same labor
union activities may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether
the union acts alone or in combination with business groups." Id. at 810.
271. Id. at 809-11. Allen Bradley involved union-employer agreements which exceeded the
traditional terms and conditions of employment (the labor market), by substantially affecting
price and market control (the commercial market). Id. In this respect Justice Black noted
that, although the agreements encompassed strikes and boycotts-legitimate union activities:
[This] was but one element in a far larger program in which contractors and manu-
facturers united with one another to monopolize all the business in New York City,
to bar all other business men from that area, and to charge the public prices above a
competitive level. It is true that victory of the union in its disputes, even had the
union acted alone, might have added to the cost of goods, or might have resulted in
individual refusals of all of their employers to buy electrical equipment not made by
Local No. 3. So far as the union might have achieved this result acting alone, it
would have been the natural consequence of labor union activities exempted by the
Clayton Act from the coverage of the Sherman Act.... But when the unions partici-
pated with a combination of business men who had complete power to eliminate all
competition among themselves and to prevent all competition from others, a situa-
tion was created not included within the exemptions of the Clayton and Norris-La-
Guardia Acts.
Id. at 809.
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statutory exemption.2 7 2 This observation was significant because it sug-
gested that the Court was willing to protect union-employer agreements
under the statutory exemption.273 However, because Local No. 3 partici-
pated in a conspiracy to monopolize the commercial market, it lost all
statutory protection.274
Justice Black defined the scope of the statutory exemption to ex-
clude unions that conspired with employers to fix prices or to monopolize
the commercial market,275 regardless of the union's intent.276 Thus,
while in Allen Bradley the Court reiterated its support for labor's statu-
tory exemption,2 77 the Court made it clear that the statutory exemption
272. Id. at 807. Specifically Justice Black stated, "had there been no union-contractor-
manufacturer combination the union's actions here, coming as they did within the exemptions
of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, would not have been violations of the Sherman
Act." Id.
273. The Allen Bradley case involved both union-employer agreements-a series of inter-
locking closed shop/hot cargo agreements-and unilateral union conduct-strikes and boy-
cotts. Justice Black clearly believed.that the union-employer agreements by themselves could
have been protected under the statutory exemption: "[e]mployers and the union did here make
bargaining agreements in which the employers agreed not to buy goods manufactured by com-
panies which did not employ members of Local No. 3.... [Siuch an agreement standing alone
would not have violated the Sherman Act." Id. at 809 (emphasis added).
However, these union-employer agreements did not stand alone. The agreements consti-
tuted "but one element in a far larger program... to monopolize all the business in New York
City... and to charge the public prices above a competitive level." Id. Thus, the dispositive
factor that led Justice Black to conclude that Local No. 3 was not statutorily protected was not
that Local No. 3 entered into the closed shop/hot cargo agreements (Justice Black would find
those exempt), but the fact that Local No. 3 aided and abetted the employers in a price fixing
conspiracy to monopolize the commercial market.
This conclusion is in accord with the holding in Hutcheson. See supra note 244.
Although Hutcheson did not involve union-employer agreements, Justice Frankfurter implied
that the statutory exemption could reach all union conduct so long as the union did not com-
bine with non-labor groups, that is, combine in the antitrust sense. See supra note 244 and
accompanying text.
274. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 809-11.
275. Id. at 808-11. Justice Black, writing for the majority, said, "we think Congress never
intended that unions could, consistently with the Sherman Act, aid non-labor groups to create
business monopolies and to control the marketing of goods and services." Id. at 808; see also
supra note 48.
276. In this case, Local No. 3 was initially motivated by legitimate intentions to secure
closed shop agreements. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 798-801.
277. Justice Black stated:
[The statutory exemption] it is argued, brings about a wholly undesirable result-one
which leaves labor unions free to engage in conduct which restrains trade. ... It is
true that many labor union activities do substantially interrupt the course of trade
and that these activities, lifted out of the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, include
substantially all, if not all, of the normal peaceful activities of labor unions ....
Congress evidently concluded, however, that the chief objective of Anti-trust legisla-
tion, preservation of business competition, could be accomplished by applying the
legislation primarily only to those business groups which are directly interested in
destroying competition.
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would not protect an otherwise lawful union-employer agreement when a
union combined with an employer to fix prices and monopolize the com-
mercial market.2 78
c. union status under Hutcheson and Allen Bradley
Under the rationale of Hutcheson and Allen Bradley, whether the
court should apply the statutory exemption turns on whether the follow-
ing two-pronged analysis has been satisfied. First, the union's conduct
must constitute a "labor dispute" as defined by the Clayton and Norris-
LaGuardia Acts.279 Second, the union must "act alone" and in its "self-
interest."28 0 A union that combines with non-labor groups in an effort to
suppress competition in the commercial market will lose statutory
immunity.
281
3. The trilogy: Apex Hosiery-Hutcheson-Allen Bradley
The Apex Hosiery-Hutcheson-Allen Bradley trilogy established the
foundation for a very sensible approach to the labor-antitrust problem.
The Apex Hosiery Court defined the scope of the Sherman Act by con-
cluding that the Act only prohibited activities aimed at eliminating com-
mercial competition.282 Thus, union activities pursued in furtherance of
traditional union objectives were free from Sherman Act scrutiny.28 3 In
Hutcheson, the Court gave full recognition to labor's statutory exemp-
tion.28 4 Accordingly, conduct that could not be enjoined under the Clay-
ton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts was exempt from the Sherman Act.285
Finally, in Allen Bradley, the Court excluded from labor's statutory ex-
emption unions that combined with employers in an effort to monopolize
the commercial market.286
Id. at 810-11.
278. This holding is consistent with Apex Hosiery, in which the Court held that the Sher-
man Act only applied to conduct which substantially affected the commercial market. See
supra notes 142-71 and accompanying text.
279. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 233-37.
280. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 810.
281. Id. at 808. See supra note 48.
282. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 493 & n.15.
283. Id. at 503-04 (Union not merely accorded an exemption-Sherman Act did not apply).
284. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 229-37.
285. Reading the Sherman, Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts as "interlacing statutes,"
the Court concluded that union activity that was protected under the latter two Acts could not
be reached by the Sherman Act. Id. at 236. See supra notes 225-55 and accompanying text.
286. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 808-11. The Court held that when a union combines with
an employer in an effort to fix prices and monopolize the commercial market, it loses its statu-
tory exemption from the Sherman Act. See supra notes 256-78 and accompanying text.
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Under the rationale of Hutcheson and Allen Bradley application of
the statutory exemption depends on two factors: (1) the existence of a
"labor dispute"; and (2) a finding that the union "acted alone" and in its
"self-interest." '287 Under this test, a union that combines with non-labor
groups in an effort to control the commercial market loses its statutory
exemption from the Sherman Act.
,However, even if a union is unable to claim the statutory exemption
under Hutcheson and Allen Bradley, it still might not be subject to the
Sherman Act under the rationale of Apex Hosiery. The dispositive factor
according to the Apex Hosiery Court, was whether the union conduct
was aimed at eliminating competition in the commercial market or aimed
at eliminating competition in the labor market.288 The former conduct is
prohibited under the Sherman Act, while the latter is beyond the scope of
the Sherman Act.2 9
B. The Nonstatutory Exemption
Despite the fact that the Hutcheson Courte90 and the Allen Bradley
Court291 were willing to apply the statutory exemption in the context of
union-employer agreements,292 the Supreme Court has subsequently re-
fused to apply the statutory exemption to such agreements.293 Instead,
the Court has created a much narrower, nonstatutory exemption applica-
ble to union-employer agreements.294 In essence, the nonstatutory ex-
287. See supra notes 227-81 and accompanying text.
288. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 494-513.
289. Id. This position was adopted by the First Circuit in Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1120 (1982). In
Allied International, the court first determined that the statutory exemption was inapplicable
because there was no "labor dispute." Id. at 1380. The court next considered whether the
complained of union conduct (politically motivated boycott) was intended to be proscribed by
the Sherman Act. The court concluded that it was not. The court stated:
While we have rejected appellees' claim that the boycott falls within the statutory
exemption from the [Sherman Act], we nevertheless think that it would be a rare case
when, absent a specific anticompetitive object or collaboration with non-labor
groups, a mere refusal to work by members of a labor union... would be held to
violate the Sherman Act.
Id. at 1381; see also Eastern Coal Corp. v. Disabled Mine Workers Ass'n, 449 F.2d 616, 618-20
(6th Cir. 1971) (court used similar analysis in concluding Sherman Act did not proscribe pick-
eting by disabled miners).
290. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
291. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
292. See supra notes 244, 273 and accompanying text. This position was consistent with the
Court's approach until 1965. See Handler & Zifchak, supra note 88, at 478, 478 n. 119.
293. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Stearfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975); Local No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676 (1965); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
294. See Handler & Zifchak, supra note 88, at 483.
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emption involves a judicial attempt to balance the policies underlying the
antitrust laws with the competing policies underlying the national labor
laws.29 This judicial balancing has lead to confusion surrounding the
application of the nonstatutory exemption.296
1. United Mine Workers v. Pennington
a the facts
In United Mine Workers v. Pennington,297 Phillips Brothers Coal
Company (Phillips), a small coal operator, filed a claim2 98 alleging that
the United Mine Workers (UMW) had conspired with certain large coal
operators to restrain and monopolize trade in violation of sections 1299
and 23"0 of the Sherman Act.3"' Phillips alleged that UMW, in agree-
ment with the large coal operators, sought to impose a uniform industry
wide wage scale on small coal operators who were not parties to any
collective bargaining agreement with UMW.3O 2 Phillips further alleged
that the effects of the wage scale made it difficult for smaller coal opera-
tors to compete with the larger ones.30 3 In response, UMW claimed that
the wage scale was exempt from the Sherman Act since it concerned only
wage standards. 3 4
b. the holding
The question before the Court was whether the union-employer
agreement imposing the wage scale was exempt from the Sherman
295. See Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.
296. See 6 J. VoN KALiNowsm, supra note 2, § 48.01, at 3; 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 76,
§ 4.04[3]-[4], at 137-38 & n.137, 152-66.
297. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
298. The original suit was filed by the trustees of the United Mine Workers of America
Welfare and Retirement Fund against Phillips Brothers Coal Company to recover $55,000 in
royalty payments allegedly due under the trust provisions of the National Bituminous Coal
Wage Agreement of 1950, an agreement into which both parties had entered. Upon filing its
answer, Phillips also filed a cross-claim alleging that United Mine Workers had violated sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by conspiring with large coal companies to restrain trade and
monopolize interstate commerce. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 659.
299. See supra note 79 for the text of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
300. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every peron who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or per-
sons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States... shall be
deemed guilty of a felony .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
301. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). Pennington, 381 U.S. at 659.
302. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 659-61, 664.
303. Id. at 660.
304. Id. at 664.
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Act.305 Writing for a plurality, Justice White30 6 concluded that the stat-
utory exemption offered no protection from the Sherman Act to union-
employer agreements. 7 Justice White offered two reasons for his con-
clusion. First, Justice White implied that the statutory exemption only
applied when a union "acts alone.' 308 By definition, a union could not be
acting alone when it entered into a union-employer agreement. Thus,
such an agreement could not be protected under the statutory exemption.
Second, Justice White reasoned that the statutory exemption only pro-
tected union activities expressly contained in section 20309 of the Clayton
Act and section 4310 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.311 Since a union-em-
ployer wage agreement was not expressly contained in either section,
there was no statutory protection from the Sherman Act.312
Justice White, however, acknowledged the importance of union-em-
ployer wage agreements under the national labor laws. 3  Justice White
stated that union-employer agreements dealing with mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining,314 such as wages, should be heavily sheltered
from the Sherman Act.31 In this regard, Justice White established the
foundation for what has become known as labor's nonstatutory exemp-
305. Id. at 661.
306. Justice White's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan. Id.
at 659. Justices Douglas, Black and Clark joined in a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 672.
Justices Goldberg, Harlan and Stewart concurred in the reversal but dissented from the plural-
ity's reasoning. Id. at 672, 697.
307. Id. at 662.
308. Id.
309. See supra note 101 for the text of section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
310. See supra note 137 for the text of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 104 (1982).
311. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 662.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 664. Justice White acknowledged that such agreements "lie at the very heart of
those subjects about which employers and unions must bargain." Id.
314. Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act mandates bargaining in "good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terns and conditions of employment .... ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1982) (emphasis added); see also Handler & Zifchak, supra note 88, at 503-04 n.255-
60 and accompanying text for cases dealing with topics considered as mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining.
315. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664. Justice White recognized that although union wage
agreements which result in eliminating competition based on wages create anticompetitive re-
straints on the product market, they are not the kinds of restraints that Congress intended the
Sherman Act to prohibit. Id. Justice White stated, "a union may make wage agreements with
a multi-employer bargaining unit and may in pursuance of its own union interests seek to
obtain the same terms from other employers. No case under the antitrust laws could be made
out on evidence limited to such union behavior." Id. at 665 (footnote omitted). Moreover,
Justice White noted that a union could, consistent with the Sherman Act, attempt unilaterally
to implement a wage agreement, even if some employers could not effectively compete if re-
quired to pay the union wage scale. Id. at 665 n.2.
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tion.3 6 The nonstatutory exemption was an attempt by Justice White to
balance the policies embodied in the Sherman Act with those policies
embodied in the National Labor Relations Act.317
Justice White, however, cautioned that not every union-employer
agreement involving a mandatory subject of collective bargaining would
be shielded by the nonstatutory exemption.31 8 Specifically, Justice White
concluded that a union-employer wage agreement would not be pro-
tected from the Sherman Act if the union agreed with the employer to
impose the wage scale on parties not in a collective bargaining relation-
ship with the union.31 9
Justice White made an important distinction between a union-em-
ployer agreement that affected only the parties to the agreement and a
union-employer agreement intended to force parties outside the collective
bargaining relationship to comply with the terms of the agreement:
320
the latter agreement would not be exempt from the Sherman Act.32'
Thus, if UMW agreed with the large coal operators to impose the terms
of the wage scale on small coal operators who were not in a collective
bargaining relationship with UMW, the nonstatutory exemption would
316. The term nonstatutory exemption was coined by the Court in Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.
In Connell, Justice Powell stated that "[t]he Court has reognized ... that a proper accommo-
dation between the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the NLRA and
the congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets requires that some
union-employer agreements be accorded a... nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanc-
tions." Id.
317. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 665. Justice White thought that the nonstatutory exemption
was an attempt to "harmoniz[e] the Sherman Act with the national policy expressed in the
National Labor Relations Act of promoting 'the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes by
subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory influence of negotiation."' Id.
(quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964)).
318. Id. at 664-66.
319. Id. at 665-66. Justice White stated:
[A] union forfeits its [nonstatutory] exemption.., when it is clearly shown that it
has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other bargain-
ing units. One group of employers may not conspire to eliminate competitors from
the industry and the union is liable with the employers if it becomes a party to the
conspiracy.
Id. Moreover, a union will be liable under the antitrust laws even though the union's role in
the scheme was limited to merely securing "wages, hours or other [working] conditions" from
other employers in the industry. Id. at 666.
320. Id. at 663.
321. Justice White noted that the latter agreement, which was intended to force parties
outside a collective bargaining relationship to comply with its terms, did not further any legiti-
mate labor interests. According to Justice White, such agreements tend to restrict a union's
freedom in future contract negotiations, id. at 666, and are open to antitrust liability. Id. at
669.
As to the former agreement, Justice White concluded that it was "beyond question" that
such an agreement could be entered into without violating the Sherman Act. Id. at 664.
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not apply.32 2 Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether UMW had agreed with large coal operators
to institute an industry wide wage agreement.323
2. Local No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v.
Jewel Tea Co.
In Local No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen
v. Jewel Tea Co.,324 a case decided the same day as Pennington, the Court
again faced the issue of whether a union-employer agreement violated the
Sherman Act. In Jewel Tea, the union-employer agreement restricted
the daily hours during which Chicago-area retail meat markets could sell
fresh meat. 325 The Court found that the union-employer agreement was
protected from the Sherman Act under the nonstatutory exemption.326
322. Id. at 669. Justice White concluded that this result did not conflict with the goals of
the national labor laws. Although one of labor's legitimate goals was unifying labor standards
to eliminate labor competition, Justice White refused to interpret the labor laws as allowing a
union and an employer, as parties to a collective bargaining agreement, to force their agree-
ments on the whole industry. Id. at 666. Justice White concluded that:
[Tihere is nothing in the labor policy indicating that the union and the employers in
one bargaining unit are free to bargain about the wages, hours and working condi-
tions of other bargaining units or to attempt to settle these matters for the entire
industry. On the contrary, the duty to bargain unit by unit leads to a quite different
conclusion. The union's obligation to its members wouid seem best served if the
union retained the ability to respond to each bargaining situation as the individual
circumstances might warrant, without being strait-jacketed by some prior agreement
with the favored employers.
Id.
It seeiis clear, however, that if UMW had attempted to implement its wage agreements
only among employers with whom it bargained, there would have been no potential Sherman
Act problems. In Pennington, that UMW allegedly attempted to force its wage scale on em-
ployers not in a collective bargaining relationship with UMW was dispositive. According to
the Court, allowing UMW to impose its wage scale on non-party employers would exceed both
national labor and antitrust policies. Id. at 666-68. The Court believed that such agreements
would be tantamount to the union surrendering its freedom of action with respect to future
collective bargaining agreements. Id.
323. Id. at 672. On remand, the district court held for UMW on the ground that Phillips
could not show predatory intent, an element that the district court believed was required by
the Supreme Court's decision. Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1966),
aff'd, 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968).
Pennington has been read to stand for three principles: (1) a union's agreed-upon restraint
on its freedom of action exposes the union to antitrust liability; (2) the agreement must have
been motivated by predatory intent in order to give rise to antitrust liability; and, most impor-
tantly, (3) mandatory subjects of collective bargaining are not automatically exempt from anti-
trust scrutiny. See Zifchak, Labor-Antitrust Principles Applicable to Joint Labor-Management
Conduct, 21 DUQ. L. REv. 365, 368 (1983).
324. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
325. Id. at 680.
326. Id. at 697.
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a. the facts
Jewel Tea involved contract negotiations between representatives of
9,000 Chicago retailers of fresh meat (the Retailers) and seven local un-
ions (the Unions).327 The Unions, which were all affiliated with Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-
CIO, represented nearly all Chicago-area butchers.328 During the heated
negotiations, the Retailers, among them Jewel Tea, demanded a relaxa-
tion of the existing contract restrictions on marketing hours for retail
meat departments. 329 The Unions rejected those demands. 330 When the
Unions threatened to strike, the Retailers, including Jewel Tea, capitu-
lated and signed the agreement.331 The agreement contained a marketing
hours provision restricting the sale of fresh meat before 9:00 a.m. and
after 6:00 p.m. 332 Subsequently, Jewel Tea brought suit against the Un-
ions claiming violations of sections 1333 and 2331 of the Sherman Act.
335
b. the holding
Justice White, again writing for a plurality,336 reaffirmed the non-
statutory exemption he had articulated the same day in Pennington. Jus-
tice White explained:
[As we] pointed out in Pennington, [the nonstatutory] exemp-
tion for union-employer agreements is very much a matter of
accommodating the coverage of the Sherman Act to the policy
of the labor laws. Employers and unions are required to bar-
gain about wages, hours and working conditions, and this fact
weighs heavily in favor of antitrust exemption for agreements
on these subjects.337
327. Id. at 680.
328. Id.
329. Id. The current agreement provided that "[m]arket operating hours shall be 9:00 a.m.
to 6:00 p.m. Monday through Saturday, inclusive. No customer shall be served who comes
into the market before or after the hours set forth above." Id. at 679-80.
330. Id. at 680.
331. Id. at 681.
332. Id.
333. See supra note 79 for the text of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
334. See supra note 300 for the text of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
335. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 681. Jewel Tea complained about the marketing hours restric-
tion, which disallowed the sale of meat before 9:00 a.m. and after 6:00 p.m. Id.
336. The Court again spit three ways. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Brennan, wrote for the Court. Id. at 679. Justices Douglas, Black and Clark dissented.
Id. at 735-38. Justices Goldberg, Harlan and Stewart concurred in the opinion, but on sub-
stantially different grounds. Id. at 697-735.
337. Id. at 689.
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The issue in Jewel Tea, according to Justice White, was whether the mar-
keting hours provision was "intimately related to wages, hours and work-
ing conditions."33 If so, the Court would have to determine whether the
provision, obtained through arm's length bargaining and in pursuit of
legitimate union objectives, was protected under the national labor laws
and was exempt from the Sherman Act.3 39
First, Justice White found that the marketing hours provision was
within the realm of wages, hours and working conditions. 34 Next, to
determine whether the national labor laws protected the Unions, Justice
White balanced the anticompetitive effects the marketing hours provision
had on the commercial market against the Unions' interest in obtaining
the marketing hours provision.341 On the one hand, Justice White found
that there were significant restraints on competition caused by the mar-
keting hours provision. 342 However, on the other hand, the Unions had
an "immediate and direct" interest in the marketing hours provision.343
Placing greater emphasis on the Unions' "immediate and direct" interest
in the marketing hours provision, Justice White concluded that the na-
tional labor policy favoring such provisions outweighed any anticompeti-
tive effects caused by the marketing hours provision. 3 " Consequently,
Justice White concluded that the provision, obtained through arm's
length bargaining, was nonstatutorily exempt from the Sherman Act.345
338. Id. at 689-90.
339. Id. Justice White stated:
The issue.., is whether the marketing hours restriction, like wages, and unlike
prices, is so intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions that the un-
ions' successful attempt to obtain that provision through bona fide, arm's length bar-
gaining in pursuit of their own labor union policies, and not at the behest of or in
combination with nonlabor groups, falls within the protection of the national labor
policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act.
Id.
340. Id. at 691-97. Justice White also noted that no evidence of a union-employer conspir-
acy existed. Id. at 688.
341. Id. at 691.
342. Id. Justice White noted, "the effect on competition [in Jewel Tea] is apparent and real,
perhaps more so than in [Pennington] .... " Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. Justice White stated:
Weighing the respective interests involved, we think the national labor policy ex-
pressed in the National Labor Relations Act places beyond the reach of the Sherman
Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how long, employees must work.
An agreement on these subjects between the union and the employers in a bargaining
unit is not illegal under the Sherman Act, nor is the union's unilateral demand for
the same contract of other employers in the industry.
Id.
345. Id.
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c. lack of majority support
The problem with the Jewel Tea decision, however, was that no sin-
gle opinion represented a majority of the Court. Justice White, who ar-
gued that the nonstatutory exemption protected the marketing hours
provision, was joined only by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Bren-
nan.34 6 Justices Goldberg, Harlan and Stewart concurred in the judg-
ment, believing that the Sherman Act did not apply in this case, but
disagreeing with Justice White's rationale.347 The concurrence reasoned
that all union-employer agreements dealing with mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining were outside the scope of the Sherman Act.348 At
the same time, Justices Douglas, Black and Clark dissented, concluding
that the marketing hours provision tended to restrain the product market
and thus violated the Sherman Act.349 According to the dissenters, the
provision itself showed an illegal union-employer conspiracy under the
Sherman Act.3
3. The adoption of a bifurcated analysis
Subsequent to Pennington and Jewel Tea, courts have followed Jus-
tice White's bifurcated analysis in labor-antitrust cases. 351 As a result,
346. Id. at 679. Likewise, in Pennington, no single opinion represented a majority of the
Court. See supra note 306.
347. Justice Goldberg, wrote one opinion applicable to both Pennington and Jewel Tea.
Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 697. In Pennington, Justice Goldberg dissented from the opinion but
concurred in the reversal. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 672. In Jewel Tea, Justice Goldberg con-
curred in the judgment but on substantially different grounds. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 697. He
believed that mandatory subjects of collective bargaining were automatically exempt from the
Sherman Act. The Justice stated, "[t]o hold that mandatory collective bargaining is com-
pletely protected [from the Sherman Act] would effectuate the congressional policies of en-
couraging free collective bargaining .... ." Id at 710. See generally Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at
697-735 (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
348. Id. at 711-13, 731-35 (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
349. Id. at 735-36 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
350. Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
351. See, eg., H.A. Artists & Assocs. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 713-16, 716
n.19 (1981); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-
23 (1975); Continental Maritime v. Pacific Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, 817 F.2d 1391,
1393 (9th Cir. 1987); Sun-Land Nurseries, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council, 793 F.2d 110,
1115-18 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1299 (1987); Altemose Constr. Co. v.
Building & Constr. Trades Council, 751 F.2d 653, 658-62 (3d Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 475 U.S.
1107 (1986); Feather v. UMW, 711 F.2d 530, 541-43 (3d Cir. 1983); Telecom Plus, Inc. v.
Local No. 3, IBEW, 719 F.2d 613, 615 (2d Cir. 1983); Carpenters Local No. 1846 v. Pratt-
Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 530-31 (5th Cir. 1982), cer, denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983);
James R. Snyder Co. v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 677 F.2d 1111, 1118 n. 10 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1015 (1982); Mid-America Regional Bargaining Ass'n v. Will County
Carpenters Dist. Council, 675 F.2d 881, 884-93 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982);
Berman Enters., Inc. v. Local No. 333, United Marine Div., 644 F.2d 930, 934-37 (2d Cir.),
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unilateral union conduct is analyzed under the statutory exemption,
while union conduct arising in the context of a union-employer agree-
ment is analyzed under the nonstatutory exemption. Under the Court's
approach in Pennington and Jewel Tea, the nonstatutory exemption turns
on the following factors: (1) whether the union-employer agreement was
negotiated at the employer's behest, (2) whether the subject of the union-
employer agreement was intimately related to mandatory subjects of col-
lective bargaining, and (3) whether the agreement affected labor relations
with third parties.3 2
By creating a more limited nonstatutory exemption, the Court has
misconstrued both Congress' intent and the Court's earlier decisions de-
fining and applying labor's statutory exemption. Congress, in passing the
Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, sought to exempt all legitimate
union activities from the Sherman Act.35 3 This was true irrespective of
whether the dispute arose in the context of a union-employer agreement
or in the context of unilateral union conduct. This result was clearly
recognized by the Court in Hutcheson and Allen Bradley.3 4 Thus, the
Court's subsequent decisions applying a more limited nonstatutory ex-
emption to union-employer agreements have betrayed Congress' intent
and the Court's earlier decisions. The height of this judicial abuse of
power came in the Court's 1975 decision, Connell Construction Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100.
311
4. Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100
a. the facts
In Connell, Local No. 100 (the Union) represented workers in the
plumbing and mechanical trades in the Dallas area. 56 In November of
1970, the Union asked Connell Construction (Connell),357 a general con-
tractor, to agree to employ only subcontracting firms that had collective
bargaining agreements with the Union. 8 The Union, however, had no
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Wet-
terau Foods, Inc., 597 F.2d 133, 135-36 (8th Cir. 1979); Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 543 F.2d 395, 401-04 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 435 U.S. 40
(1978).
352. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 661-69; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 688-97. See also 1 T. KHEEL,
supra note 76, § 4.04[2], at 125.
353. See supra notes 99-112, 132-41 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 227-78 and accompanying text.
355. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
356. Id. at 619.
357. Id. Connell was a general building contractor that subcontracted out construction
projects to both union and nonunion companies. Id.
358. Id. at 618-19. This is known as a hot cargo agreement. A hot cargo agreement applies
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desire to represent Connell's employees.35 9 The Union's sole purpose in
requesting the agreement was to organize as many subcontractors as pos-
sible. 31 Connell refused to sign any such agreement with the Union. 61
Upon Connell's refusal, the Union staged a strike at one of Connell's
major construction sites, halting construction. 62 Under pressure, Con-
nell signed the agreement.3 63 Subsequently, Connell brought suit against
the Union, alleging, among other things, that the agreement violated sec-
tions 1364 and 2365 of the Sherman Act. 66
b. the holding
Justice Powell, writing for a 5-4 majority, noted at the outset that
the Union could not claim the statutory exemption if the conduct com-
plained of involved "concerted action or agreements between unions and
nonunion parties. 3 67 Since the conduct complained of involved a union-
employer agreement, the Union could not rely on the statutory exemp-
tion. Thus, the only exemption from the Sherman Act available to the
Union was the nonstatutory exemption. 68 In this regard Justice Powell
direct and indirect pressure on an employer to refrain from doing business with a third party in
order to persuade the third party to meet union demands. See Annotation, NLRA-Hot
Cargo Provisions, 39 A.L.R. FED. 16 (1978). Such agreements constitute an unfair labor prac-
tice under section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982) (exemp-
tions for the construction and garment industry). See infra note 378 for the text of
construction industry proviso to section 8(e).
In the instant case, the Union wanted Connell to sign an agreement which included the
following:
[T]he contractor and the union mutually agree with respect to work falling within
the scope of the agreement that is to be done at the site of the construction, altera-
tion, painting, or repairs of any building, structure or other works, that [if] the con-
tractor should contract or subcontract any of the aforesaid work falling within the
normal trade jurisdiction of the union, said contractor shall contract such work only
to firms that are parties to an executed, current collective bargaining agreement with
Local Union 100 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry.
Connell, 421 U.S. at 619-20.
359. Connell, 421 U.S. at 619.
360. Id. at 625.
361. Id. at 620.
362. Id. Approximately 150 of Connell's employees walked off the job. Id.
363. Id.
364. See supra note 79 for the text of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
365. See supra note 300 for the text of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
366. Connell, 421 U.S. at 620-21. Connell also alleged violations of state antitrust laws. Id.
at 619-20.
367. Id. at 622.
368. Id. at 622-23. Justice Powell, citing Pennington and Jewel Tea, traced the origins of
the nonstatutory exemption to the national labor policy favoring a union's eliminating compe-
tition over wages and working conditions in the labor market. Id. at 622 (citing United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) and Local No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters
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defined the scope of the nonstatutory exemption narrowly, stating that
"while the statutory exemption allows unions to accomplish some [di-
rect] restraints [on competition].., the nonstatutory exemption affords
no similar protection .... ,,69 Thus, if the agreement produced direct
effects on the market, the nonstatutory exemption would be inapplicable.
With this in mind, Justice Powell set out to determine what effects the
agreement had on the commercial market.
The Court conceded that the Union had attempted to achieve en-
tirely legitimate goals. 370 Moreover, Justice Powell noted that no evi-
dence of a conspiracy existed.3 7 1 Nevertheless, the Court ultimately
concluded that the agreement may have violated the Sherman Act.372
Justice Powell cited two reasons for the Court's conclusion. First, a pro-
vision of the agreement rendered nonunion subcontractors ineligible to
compete for actual jobs.373 This created a direct impact on the commer-
cial market.3 74 Justice Powell stated:
This kind of direct restraint on the business market has sub-
stantial anticompetitive effects, both actual and potential, that
would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition
over wages and working conditions. It contravenes antitrust
policy to a degree not justified by congressional labor policy,
and therefore cannot claim a nonstatutory exemption from the
& Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965)). Thus, under the nonstatutory
exemption, courts must balance the national labor policy favoring collective bargaining against
the antitrust policy promoting free competition.
369. Id. at 622.
Justice Powell in effect created two separate categories of agreements with respect to the
nonstatutory exemption: (1) agreements that create direct effects on the commercial market
are not afforded protection under the nonstatutory exemption; and (2) agreements that do not
create direct effects on the market can benefit from the nonstatutory exemption. Id. at 621-26.
This result directly conflicts with the Court's decision in Jewel Tea. In Jewel Tea, Justice
White, although acknowledging the agreement created direct effects on the commercial mar-
ket, nevertheless applied the nonstatutory exemption. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 691-97. See
supra notes 342-44 and accompanying text.
370. Connell, 421 U.S. at 625. Justice Powell observed, "[t]his record contains no evidence
that the union's goal was anything other than organizing as many subcontractors as possible.
This goal was legal, even though a successful organizing campaign ultimately would reduce the
competition that unionized employers face from nonunion firms." Id.
371. Id. at 625 n.2. Justice Powell went on to say, "in fact, Connell has not argued the case
on a theory of conspiracy between the union and unionized subcontractors. It has simply
relied on the multiemployer agreement as a factor enhancing the restraint of trade implicit in
the subcontracting agreement it signed." Id.
372. Id. at 635. This case was remanded for a determination of whether the agreement
violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 637.
373. Id. at 625.
374. Id.
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antitrust laws.
375
Hence, finding that the agreement impacted the commercial market,
weighed heavily in the Court's decision not to apply the nonstatutory
exemption. Second, the agreement was not protected by federal labor
policies favoring collective bargaining since the Union made no attempt
to represent Connell's employees.376  Thus, despite the Court's finding
that the Union was pursuing wholly legitimate objectives, the nonstatu-
tory exemption was inapplicable.377
The Union defended the agreement on two grounds. First, the
Union argued that the agreement fell within the construction industry
proviso to section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act.378 Second,
the Union contended that, even if the agreement violated section 8(e),
Connell's exclusive remedy was contained in the national labor laws.379
In support of its first argument the Union asserted a literal interpretation
of the construction industry proviso,380 arguing that since Connell was
an employer in the construction industry, the Union was a labor organi-
zation, and the agreement covered only work to be done at the construc-
tion site, the construction industry proviso to section 8(e) applied.38'
375. Id. at 626.
376. Id. at 625.
377. This rationale is at odds with the Court's decision in Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 688-97.
See infra notes 392-403 and accompanying text.
378. Connell, 421 U.S. at 626. Section 8(e) of the NLRA (passed as part of the Landrum
Griffin Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519, codified as amended in scattered sections
of 29 U.S.C.), which prohibits hot cargo agreements, provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, trans-
porting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease
doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into...
containing such an agreement shall be... void ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982). Section 8(e) contains a construction industry proviso which states:
Provided, That nothing in [section 8(e)] shall apply to an agreement between a labor
organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting
or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, paint-
ing, or repair of a building, structure, or other work ....
Id. (construction industry proviso).
Both lower courts held that the agreement came within the construction industry proviso
and was thus exempt from the Sherman Act. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters
Local No. 100, 78 L.R.R.M. 3012 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 483 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1973),
rev'd, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
At least one court has held that an agreement protected under the construction industry
proviso automatically excludes that agreement from Sherman Act scrutiny. See Suburban Tile
Center, Inc. v. Rockford Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 354 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966).
379. Connell, 421 U.S. at 633-34.
380. Id. at 626-27.
381. Id.
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Connell responded that the construction industry proviso was only in-
tended to protect agreements arising out of a collective bargaining rela-
tionship.382 Since this agreement did not arise out of a collective
bargaining relationship, the construction industry proviso offered the
Union no protection. 8 3
The Court agreed with Connell. The Court noted that although the
construction industry proviso suggested no limitations, it must be con-
strued in light of congressional intent.384 Reviewing the legislative his-
tory surrounding the passage of section 8(e), Justice Powell concluded
that only agreements arising in the context of a collective bargaining rela-
tionship, and that were restricted to a particular job site, were protected
by the construction industry proviso.3 5 Thus, because the Union's
agreement was aimed at employers not parties to a collective bargaining
agreement, and was not limited to any particular job site,386 the Connell
Court found that the agreement violated section 8(e).387
The Union further argued that even if the agreement violated sec-
tion 8(e), Connell's exclusive remedy was contained in the national labor
laws.388 Rejecting the Union's contention, Justice Powell concluded that
"[t]here is no legislative history in the 1959 Congress suggesting that la-
bor-law remedies for [section] 8(e) violations were intended to be exclu-
sive, or that Congress thought allowing antitrust remedies in cases like
the present one would be inconsistent with the remedial scheme of the
NLRA.' ' 389 Thus, the Court held that Connell could maintain an anti-
382. Id. at 627.
383. Id. at 627-28.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 626-35.
386. Subsequent to Connell, the Court in Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456
U.S. 645 (1982), held that a lawful hot cargo agreement arising out of a collective bargaining
relationship need not be limited in application to a particular job site. Id. at 666.
387. Connell, 421 U.S. at 626-35.
388. Id. at 633-34.
389. Id. at 634. Justice Powell found it significant that Congress did not provide for any
express remedies for parties injured by agreements violating section 8(e) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982). Many commentators believe Justice Powell misread the legislative
intent behind the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). See, eg., Handler, supra note 161, at 1343-44.
Professor Handler has stated:
The notion that the NLRA was not the exclusive remedy for an unfair labor practice
had no foundation in prior law [before Connell] .... In ruling that dual remedies
were appropriate, Justice Powell looked to the legislative history of the Landrum-
Griffin Amendments. While Congress had made it clear that the remedies accorded
union unfair labor practices under the Taft-Hartley Act were to be exclusive, in 1959
Congress was largely silent on the exclusivity of the labor remedies under Landrum-
Griffin. Justice Powell construed this silence to allow for antitrust liability. But Jus-
tice Powell's premise must have been that the hot cargo boycott agreement was not
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trust action against the Union.39 0
immune from antitrust prior to the Landrum-Griffin Amendments, whose purpose
was to render such agreements unlawful under the labor law, thereby filling the gap
left open by the Taft-Hartley Act. This premise was faulty. In fact, Hutcheson had
immunized the secondary labor boycott, and, from an antitrust point of view, there is
no difference in market impact between a boycott brought about by union pressure
tactics and a collective bargaining agreement requiring a boycott of nonunion con-
tractors; in each instance a party is foreclosed from access to the commercial market.
Furthermore, a series of Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Hutcheson taught
that all secondary boycotts, including hot cargo agreements, were immune from anti-
trust. Thus, Cofigress wrote the Landrum-Griffin Amendments at a time when it
was clear that a boycott agreement was no longer subject to antitrust. In this con-
text, congressional silence as to the exclusivity of the labor remedy could not reason-
ably be construed as reversing the well-established antitrust immunity.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Handler & Zifchak, supra note 88, at 486-87.
390. Connell, 421 U.S. at 616. Justice Stewart dissented. He believed the majority improp-
erly characterized the legislative history surrounding the passage of section 8(e). Id. at 639
(Stewart, J., dissenting). The Justice noted that Congress did not provide dual remedies, that
is, antitrust and labor remedies for union agreements that violated section 8(e):
The relevant legislative history unmistakably demonstrates that in regulating secon-
dary activity and 'hot cargo' agreements in 1947 and 1959, Congress selected with
great care the sanctions to be imposed if proscribed union activity should occur. In
so doing, Congress rejected efforts to give private parties injured by union activity
such as that engaged in by Local 100 the right to seek relief under federal antitrust
laws.
Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart greatly emphasized that Congress rejected numerous proposals aimed at
applying the Sherman Act to conduct prohibited under the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, Pub.
L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). Id. at
646-55 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart warned that the majority's "imposition of
'independent federal remedies' not intended by Congress... threatens 'to upset the balance of
power between labor and management expressed in our national labor policy."' Id. at 655
(quoting Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260
(1964)) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Justice Stewart's argument is particularly compelling in light of the remedial scheme con-
tained in the NLRA. Section 303 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1982) (passed pursuant to
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982)), provides an adequate remedy against
a union's secondary pressures necessary to secure a hot cargo agreement. See Handler &
Zifchak, supra note 88, at 488. Moreover, the legislative history surrounding the passage of
the Taft-Hartley Act clearly established that section 303 was intended to be an exclusive rem-
edy. See Handler & Zifchak, supra note 88, at 486. Thus, despite the lack of an express
remedy for hot cargo agreements themselves, under Landrum-Griffin Congress contemplated
that a party injured by such an agreement would be fully compensated under section 303.
Since section 303 is intended to be an exclusive remedy which provides the necessary compen-
satory relief, there is no need to seek relief under the Sherman Act.
Justice Powell, on the other hand, argued that the absence of an express congressional
remedy for the hot cargo agreement itself meant that such an agreement could be remedied
under the Sherman Act. Justice Powell stated, "whatever significance this legislative choice
[i.e. the exclusive remedy under Taft-Hartley for section 303] has for antitrust suits based on
those secondary activities prohibited by § 8(b)(4), it has no relevance to the question whether
Congress meant to preclude antitrust suits based on the 'hot cargo' agreements it outlawed in
1959." Connell, 421 U.S. 634. Thus, Justice Powell's opinion created a paradox: despite the
fact that the Court had consistently held that punitive damages are inconsistent with the poli-
cies underlying the national labor laws, the Court relied on Congress' failure to include coin-
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The Connell decision was important because it unequivocally re-
moved union-employer agreements from the broad protection of the stat-
utory exemption. 391 Union-employer agreements are now protected only
by the more narrow, nonstatutory exemption.
5. Application of the nonstatutory exemption: conflicting approaches
under Jewel Tea and Connell
In Jewel Tea, the issue was whether a marketing hours provision
incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement violated the Sherman
Act.3 92 The Court held that the provision was exempt from the Sherman
Act.39 In Connell, the issue was whether a union-employer agreement
not arising out of a collective bargaining relationship violated the Sher-
man Act.3 94 The Court held that the agreement could be the basis of an
antitrust attack.395 Although the Court in both cases applied the non-
statutory exemption framework, the Court's approach in the two cases
was radically inconsistent.
In both Jewel Tea and Connell, the Court acknowledged the exist-
ence of two opposing factors: the Unions' self-interest in the agree-
ments396 and that the agreements created direct restraints on the
commercial market.397 However, the Court's balancing of these two fac-
tors varied greatly. On the one hand, the Jewel Tea Court placed consid-
erable emphasis on the fact that the Union's interest was "immediate and
direct. ' 398 This "immediate and direct" interest justified any anticompe-
titive effects the agreement had on the commercial market. In contrast,
the Connell Court emphasized the fact that the agreement restrained the
commercial market.3 99 Consequently, the Connell Court found that the
agreement was not exempt from the Sherman Act. These two cases rep-
resent fundamentally different outcomes under the nonstatutory exemp-
pensatory damage remedies against parties violating section 8(e) to justify imposing treble
damages under the Sherman Act. See Handler & Zifchak, supra note 88, at 489 n.173 and
accompanying text.
A full discussion of the exclusivity issue is beyond the scope of this Comment. However,
for an excellent overview of the problem see St. Antoine, supra note 75, at 616-31; Handler &
Zifchak, supra note 88, at 486-92; Handler, supra note 161, at 1343-48; 1 T. KHEEL, supra note
76, § 4.04[4], at 372-74.
391. Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.
392. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 679. See supra notes 325-50 and accompanying text.
393. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 697.
394. Connell, 421 U.S. at 619-37. See supra notes 355-91 and accompanying text.
395. Connell, 421 U.S. at 637.
396. See supra notes 343, 370 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 342, 373-75 and accompanying text.
398. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 691.
399. Connell, 421 U.S. at 623-25.
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tion,4° ° and suggest that liability for union-employer agreements under
the Sherman Act depends solely on what factors courts choose to give
greater emphasis. This wide-open analysis makes the nonstatutory ex-
emption both unpredictable and highly manipulable.
Several conclusions regarding the nonstatutory exemption can be
drawn. First, as demonstrated by the differing outcomes under Jewel Tea
and Connell, application of the nonstatutory exemption is unpredict-
able.4 1 Second, the nonstatutory exemption is much more limited in
scope than the statutory exemption.'" 2 Thus, the protection afforded
union-employer agreements from the Sherman Act is much less expan-
sive than the protection afforded unilateral union activities under the
statutory exemption." 3 These conclusions necessitate a reexamination of
labor's nonstatutory exemption.
400. Of course, the major distinguishing factor between Jewel Tea and Connell is the fact
that the agreement in Jewel Tea arose out of a collective bargaining relationship, whereas in
Connell there was no such relationship. However, whatever importance this might have had
has been somewhat diminished by the fact that some lower courts have applied the Connell
approach to union-employer agreements arising out of a collective bargaining relationship.
See, eg., Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 751 F.2d 653 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1107 (1986); Feather v. UMW, 711 F.2d 530 (3d Cir. 1983);
Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated
on other grounds, 488 U.S. 902 (1980); Commerce Tankers v. National Maritime Union, 553
F.2d 793 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977).
In contrast, some courts have held that the Jewel Tea approach prevails in the context of
collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Sun-Land Nurseries, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Dist.
Council, 793 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1299 (1987); Home
Box Office v. Director's Guild, 708 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1983); James R. Snyder Co. v. Associated
Gen. Contractors, 677 F.2d 1111 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1015 (1982); Granddad
Bread, Inc. v. Continental Baking Co., 612 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 449 U.S.
1076 (1981).
401. See 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 76, § 4.0413], at 138 n.137, § 4.04 [a]-[5], at 152-66; see
also, 6 J. VON KALiNowss, supra note 2, § 48.01, at 3.
402. This conclusion necessarily follows from the logic in Connell. In Connell, Justice Pow-
ell made it clear that union-employer agreements that have direct effects on the market will not
be protected by the nonstatutory exemption. Connell, 421 U.S. at 622-23. See supra note 369
and accompanying text. Justice Powell made it equally clear, however, that unilateral activi-
ties that create direct effects on the market may still be protected by labor's statutory exemp-
tion. Connell, 421 U.S. at 622-23.
403. This result is somewhat of an anamoly. On the one hand, a union may implement the
weapons of industrial warfare-strikes, boycotts and pickets-virtually free from Sherman Act
liability. Yet on the other hand the "peace treaty"-union-employer agreements-which re-
suits from the industrial warfare are subject to almost unlimited Sherman Act review. This is
so despite the fact that these "peace treaties" are often the result of a statutorily imposed duty
under the national labor laws. See 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 76, § 4.04[3], at 134; see also Local
No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 712
(1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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VI. THE NONSTATUTORY EXEMPTION: A STEP BACKWARDS IN
LABOR-ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
The nonstatutory exemption4 4 applicable to union-employer agree-
ments has been marked by confusion and controversy. The split Court at
the genesis of the exemption in United Mine Workers v. Pennington"o5
and Local No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v.
Jewel Tea Co.4 6 exemplifies this confusion and controversy. In fact,
even later cases such as Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfit-
ters Local No. 1001o have done little to clarify this problem. The prob-
lem is two-fold. First, the Court, by creating the nonstatutory
exemption, has not been true to Congress' underlying purpose in passing
the antitrust and labor laws. Second, the Court, in creating the nonstatu-
tory exemption, has strayed from its own decisions defining the scope of
the statutory exemption. As a result, labor-antitrust analysis veered off-
course long ago and has continued to drift away.
This section examines the interplay between union-employer agree-
ments and the principles espoused by the Court in United States v.
Hutcheson4"8 and Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, IBEW. °9 It con-
cludes that application of the statutory exemption to controversies aris-
ing from the terms or the enforcement of union-employer agreements is
not only the soundest course for courts to take, but is also supported by
congressional intent and past Court precedent.
A. Union-Employer Agreements and the Statutory Exemption: Never
the Twain Shall Meet?
1. Statutory exemption: two-pronged analysis
In Hutcheson, the Court, recognizing labor's statutory exemption,
reasoned that the Sherman,410 Clayton411 and Norris-LaGuardiagt 2Acts
404. See supra notes 290-403 and accompanying text for discussion of the nonstatutory
exemption.
405. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). See supra notes 297-323, 351-52 and accompanying text.
406. 381 U.S. 676 (1965). See supra notes 324-52, 392-403 and accompanying text.
407. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). See supra notes 355-403 and accompanying text.
408. 312 U.S. 219 (1941). See supra notes 225-55, 284-85, 287 and accompanying text.
409. 325 U.S. 797 (1945). See supra notes 256-78, 286-87 and accompanying text.
410. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). See supra notes 12-98 and accompanying text for discussion
of the Sherman Act.
411. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1982). See supra notes 99-131 and
accompanying text for discussion of the Clayton Act.
412. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982). See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text for dis-
cussion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
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must be read together "as a harmonizing text of outlawry of labor con-
duct." '413 In this light, the Court concluded that so long as the union's
conduct falls within the bounds of a "labor dispute" as redefined by the
Norris-LaGuardia Act,414 the conduct was exempt from the Sherman
Act.
4 15
Subsequent to Hutcheson, the Court in Allen Bradley held that the
existence of a "labor dispute" was not, by itself, dispositive of the Sher-
man Act question.41 6 Instead, the Court determined that once a "labor
dispute" existed, the next question to ask was whether the union "acted
alone" or in "combination" with non-labor groups in an effort to monop-
olize the commercial market.417 A union that combines with non-labor
groups in an effort to suppress competition in the commercial market
falls outside statutory protection.418 The Hutcheson and Allen Bradley
cases delineate a two-pronged test for determining whether the statutory
exemption applies. First, does the union conduct fall within the statu-
tory definition of "labor dispute?" 419 Second, assuming the first prong is
satisfied, has the union "acted alone" and in its "self-interest," and not in
"combination" with non-labor groups?4 20
a. "labor dispute" requirement
Central to concluding that the statutory exemption applies is the
finding of a "labor dispute" as that term is defined by the Clayton and
413. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941). See supra notes 237-42 and
accompanying text.
414. See supra note 101 for the text of section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982)
(defining "labor dispute"). See also supra note 139 and accompanying text for the text of
section 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1982) (defining "labor
dispute").
415. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 227-37. See supra notes 237-50 and accompanying text.
416. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 808-11 (1945).
417. Id. See supra notes 279-81, 286-87 and accompanying text. This is similar to the
Hutcheson language. In Hutcheson, the Court implied that the statutory exemption would
apply so long as the union acted in its "self-interest" and did not combine with non-labor
groups. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232. In Allen Bradley, the Court held that so long as the union
"acts alone" and not in combination with non-labor groups, the statutory exemption will ap-
ply. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 810. Whether the "self-interest" requirement and the "act
alone" requirement are meant to mean the same thing is unclear. What is clear, however, is
that both opinions imply that an antitrust combination must be present in order for the union
to lose statutory protection. See supra note 244 for a discussion on how the Hutcheson Court
defined combination.
418. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 408-11. See supra notes 48, 417.
419. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 231-37. See supra notes 227-81, 286-87 and accompanying
text.
420. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 408-11. See supra notes 227-81, 286-87 and accompanying
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Norris-LaGuardia Acts.421 In determining whether a "labor dispute"
exists, the logical first question is whether the union conduct meets the
statutory requirements for a "labor dispute."
i. statutory definition
Section 13(c)422 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act broadly defines "labor
dispute. '4 23 Congress used sweeping language to "obviate the results of
the judicial construction" given the Clayton Act.424 Despite this lan-
guage, the Court has chosen to narrowly construe the term "labor dis-
pute" for purposes of labor-antitrust analysis. For instance, in the
Pennington-Jewel Tea-Connell line of cases,425 the Court implicitly sug-
gested that controversies arising from the terms or the enforcement of
union-employer agreements do not constitute "labor disputes. ' 426 The
immediate consequence of such a holding is that such controversies will
never be protected from the Sherman Act under the statutory exemption.
There are several problems with the Court's restrictive interpreta-
tion of the term "labor dispute" in the context of union-employer agree-
ments. First, such an interpretation conflicts with the Court's own
holdings that section 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which defines
"labor dispute," must be broadly construed. For instance, in Jackson-
ville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Association,427
the Court considered whether a politically-motivated work stoppage fell
within the meaning of "labor dispute" as defined by section 13(C) 42 8 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.429 In concluding that the union conduct con-
421. See supra note 139 and accompanying text for the text of section 13(c) of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1982) (defining "labor dispute"). See also supra note 101
for the text of section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982) (defining "labor dispute").
422. See supra note 139 and accompanying text for text of section 13(c) of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1982).
423. See Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S.
702, 712 (1982).
424. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 234.
425. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 662; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689; Connell, 421 U.S. at 621-23.
See supra notes 297-391 and accompanying text.
426. Id. Although the Court in these three cases did not expressly hold that controversies
arising from the terms or the enforcement of union-employer agreements do not constitute
"labor disputes" for labor-antitrust analysis, this is the effect of the holdings. By expressly
excluding union-employer agreements from the ambit of the statutory exemption, these three
cases constructively remove such agreements from the scope of "labor disputes"-the essential
component of the statutory exemption.
427. 457 U.S. 702 (1982).
428. See supra note 139 and accompanying text for the text of section 13(c) of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.
429. Jacksonville, 457 U.S. at 704.
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stituted a "labor dispute,"43 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court,
stated:
Our decisions have recognized that the term "labor dispute"
must not be narrowly construed because the statutory defini-
tion itself is extremely broad and because Congress deliberately
included a broad definition to overrule judicial decisions that
had unduly restricted the Clayton Act's labor exemption from
the antitrust laws.431
Thus, the Court has clearly articulated a broad framework from which to
analyze the term "labor dispute."432
Applying this broad analytical framework to the context of union-
employer agreements suggests only one conclusion: plainly within any
common-sense reading of section 13(c), the term "labor dispute" neces-
sarily encompasses controversies arising from the terms or the enforce-
ment of union-employer agreements.433 The language of section 13(c) is
unmistakably clear-a "labor dispute" includes controversies arising
from "representations of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment.
434
Thus, the Court is wrong to suggest, as it did in the Pennington-Jewel
Tea-Connell line of cases, that controversies arising out of union-em-
ployer agreements can never form the basis of a "labor dispute."
The Court's restrictive interpretation of "labor dispute" is also in-
consistent with its earlier labor-antitrust decisions. For example, in Allen
Bradley, the disputed union conduct involved both unilateral conduct
(strikes and boycotts) and union-employer agreements (series of inter-
locking closed shop/hot cargo agreements).435 Nevertheless, the Court
recognized that a "labor dispute" existed. The Court stated, "[ilt has
been argued that no labor disputes existed. The argument is untena-
ble.... Local No. 3 is a labor union and its spur to action related to
wages and working conditions. '436 The logical extension of this argu-
ment is that the finding of a "labor dispute" presumably would have trig-
430. Id. at 719.
431. Id. at 711-12.
432. See also Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama S.S., 362 U.S. 365, 369-70 (1960);
International Ass'n of Machinist and Aerospace Workers v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 826 F.2d
1141, 1145 (1st Cir. 1987) (term "labor dispute" should be "broadly and liberally construed");
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Guilford Transp. Industries, Inc., 803 F.2d
1228, 1232-33 (1st Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 1972 (1987).
433. See Adams, Ray & Rosenberg v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 403, 406-
11 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (applying term to union-employer agreement).
434. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1982).
435. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 799-800. See supra notes 256-78 and accompanying text.
436. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 807 n.12 (emphasis added). See Carpenters Local No. 1846
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gered the statutory exemption, protecting from the Sherman Act both
the unilateral union conduct and the union-employer agreements.
437
However, the Court's finding that Local No. 3 combined with employers
to eliminate competition in the commercial market, effectively stripped
Local No. 3 of any statutory protection. 38 The significance of the
Court's opinion, however, lies in the fact that the Court seemed willing to
find a "labor dispute" in the context of controversies arising from the
terms or the enforcement of union-employer agreements. 39 Thus, in the
absence of a union-employer combination 4 aimed at fixing prices, the
Court was willing to apply the statutory exemption in the context of
union-employer agreements." 1
The Court's underlying rationale in the Pennington-Jewel Tea-Con-
nell line of cases, that the term "labor dispute" does not apply to union-
employer agreements in the labor antitrust context has no foundation for
support. To the contrary, Congress' broad statutory language coupled
with the Court's holding in Hutcheson and Allen Bradley suggests that
controversies arising from the terms or the enforcement of union-em-
ployer agreements may fall within the definition of "labor dispute," and
thus be protected by labor's statutory exemption.
Assuming that a "labor dispute" is found to exist, the Clayton 442
and Norris-LaGuardia" 3 Acts prohibit federal courts from issuing in-
junctions. 4 " Section 144 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act expressly prohib-
its the issuance of injunctions in "a case involving or growing out of a
labor dispute."" 6 Thus, in the absence of any type of union-employer
v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 531 n.22 (5th Cir. 1982) (conduct involved in Allen
Bradley constituted "labor dispute"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983).
437. See supra notes 269-73 and accompanying text.
438. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 807-13.
439. Id. at 807 n.12; see also supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
440. The term "combination" throughout this Comment is used in the antitrust sense.
That is, a union that adopts an employer's antitrust animus in an effort to eliminate competi-
tion in the commercial market has combined with that employer.
441. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 809. This conclusion is consistent with the Court's decision
in Hutcheson. In Hutcheson, although dealing solely with unilateral union conduct, the Court
made it clear that the union would lose its antitrust immunity only if it combined with non-
labor groups. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232. The Court defined the term "combination" in the
antitrust sense. Id. at 232 n.3. See supra note 244. Thus, union-employer agreements free
from antitrust taint would be protected by the statutory exemption.
442. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1982).
443. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
444. This assumes that the exceptions contained in section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
29 U.S.C. § 107 (1982), do not apply.
445. See supra note 137 for the text of section 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982).
446. Id. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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combination to eliminate competition in the commercial market, no in-
junction can be issued and thus the disputed conduct is exempt from the
Sherman Act.' 7
ii. public policy
Presuming courts are unwilling to give the broad construction to the
term "labor dispute" that Congress intended, there is an alternative ap-
proach that would equally satisfy the first prong of the statutory exemp-
tion. Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act incorporates, as part of the
public policy of the United States, union-employer agreements involving
"terms and conditions of employment.""'  In addition, section 1 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits courts from issuing injunctions "con-
trary to the public policy declared in this [Act]." 9 Thus, section 1 ex-
pressly prohibits courts from issuing injunctions in controversies arising
from the terms or the enforcement of such union-employer agreements.
Although under this approach it is not necessary to label the dispute
a "labor dispute," the logic of Hutcheson still controls. The underlying
premise of Hutcheson is that activities protected by the Clayton and Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Acts are to be exempted from the Sherman Act.45 The
vehicle used by the Hutcheson Court to achieve this result was the find-
ing of a "labor dispute." An equally plausible vehicle is the finding of a
protected public policy. Since the Norris-LaGuardia Act expressly pro-
tects union-employer agreements from injunctions as a matter of public
policy, the Hutcheson logic dictates that the protection should also be
extended to bar courts from issuing injunctions pursuant to the Sherman
Act. Thus, under either the "labor dispute" approach or the "public pol-
icy" approach, union-employer agreements may be protected from in-
junctive relief and therefore may also be protected from the Sherman
Act.451
b. "acting alone" and "self-interest" requirements
Assuming that a "labor dispute" exists, it does not necessarily fol-
low that the statutory exemption applies. The union must also "act
447. This argument assumes, of course, that the union has "acted alone" and in its "self-
interest," and not in combination with non-labor groups.
448. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). See supra note 135 for the text of section 2 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.
449. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See supra note 137 for the text of section 1 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.
450. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 227-37.
451. See supra note 447.
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alone" and in its "self-interest.
45 2
i. "act alone"
The requirement that a union must "act alone" can be traced to the
Court's holding in Allen Bradley."3 In Allen Bradley, the Court ex-
plained, "[o]ur holding means that the same labor union activities may or
may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon whether the
union acts alone or in combination with business groups. '454 Thus, unions
should only be liable under the Sherman Act when they combine with
non-labor groups.455
The use of the term "combination" by the Allen Bradley Court was
not meant to encompass all union-employer agreements.456 To the con-
trary, the Court's usage of the term "combination" meant concerted ac-
tion in the antitrust sense, where a union adopts a non-labor group's
antitrust animus in an effort to suppress competition in the commercial
market. 57 This interpretation of "combination" is further supported by
the Allen Bradley Court's recognition that the term "act alone" could
apply to certain union-employer agreements which standing alone would
not violate the Sherman Act.45 8 In other words, the Court was not defin-
ing "act alone" literally to exclude all union-employer agreements.
Rather, the Court merely held that a union could not have been "acting
alone" if it "combined" with non-labor groups.4 59 Thus, under the
Court's earlier decisions, controversies arising from the terms or the en-
forcement of union-employer agreements satisfied the "act alone" re-
quirement of the statutory exemption.
Unfortunately, this has not been the prevailing view. The Court in
Pennington implicitly held that the statutory exemption was unavailable
452. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 810 ("act alone" requirement); Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232
("self-interest" requirement). See supra notes 227-78, 280, 287 and accompanying text.
453. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 810. In Hutcheson, however, the Court hinted at this re-
quirement when it stated, "[s]o long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups [the statutory exemption will apply] .... ." Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232.
The Hutcheson Court thus implied that if a union does not combine with non-labor groups, it
will be protected from the Sherman Act by the statutory exemption.
454. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 810 (emphasis added).
455. This position is consistent with Hutcheson and Allen Bradley. See supra notes 244,
273, 441 and accompanying text.
456. To the contrary, the term "combination" was used by both the Hutcheson and Allen
Bradley Courts to mean only concerted activity in the antitrust sense-agreeing to eliminate
competition in the commercial market. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232 n.3; Allen Bradley, 325
U.S. at 807-13. See supra notes 244, 273.
457. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232 n.3; Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 807-13.
458. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 809. See 1 T. KHEEL, supra note 76, § 4.04[3], at 141, 148.
459. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 809-10.
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to controversies arising from the terms or the enforcement of union-em-
ployer agreements because the union had not literally "acted alone.
' 4 6 0
This rationale was reaffirmed by the Court in Connell.461 The two cases,
however, misconstrued the concept of "acting alone." Neither the Pen-
nington nor Connell Courts considered the possibility that within the
context of a union-employer agreement a union could "act alone" in the
sense of acting independently of an employer's antitrust animus.
4 62
Clearly, however, the Allen Bradley Court contemplated that "acting
alone" meant acting independently of such employer animus.
4 63
The Allen Bradley Court required that unions "act alone" to ensure
that unions would not combine with non-labor groups to suppress com-
petition in the commercial market.464 This reasoning is consistent with
Congress' intent behind the Sherman Act.465 Thus, it would be wrong to
suggest that the "act alone" requirement was meant to exclude all union-
employer agreements from the ambit of the statutory exemption. This
fundamental misunderstanding by the Court over the interpretation of
the "act alone" requirement in Pennington and Connell resulted in creat-
ing and perpetuating a limited, highly manipulable and unnecessary non-
statutory exemption.
Furthermore, the Court's misconception of what constitutes the
"act alone" requirement infringes upon the policies enumerated in the
national labor laws. The labor laws view union-employer agreements as
a desirable end result of direct union pressure tactics (e.g., strikes and
boycotts). However, the Court's approach in Pennington and Connell
relegates such agreements to a lower status. As one commentator stated,
"the Pennington-Connell approach appears to see union/employer agree-
ments as, if not aberrant, then as somehow unanticipated consequences
beyond the ken of the statutory scheme.
466
460. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 661-63. Furthermore, in Pennington, Justice White suggested
that the statutory exemption protects only union activities expressly contained in section 20 of
the Clayton Act and section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See supra notes 309-11 and ac-
companying text. However, neither Hutcheson norAllen Bradley can be read as so limiting the
statutory exemption. Under the rationale of Hutcheson and Allen Bradley, satisfaction of the
two-pronged test triggers the statutory exemption irrespective of whether the union conduct
involved was expressly contained in sections 4 or 20.
461. Connell, 421 U.S. at 621-22.
462. See I T. KHEEL, supra note 76, § 4.04[3], at 141.
463. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 810.
464. Id. at 807-13.
465. See supra note 48.
466. See I T. KHEEL, supra note 76, § 4.04[3], at 137.
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ii. "self-interest"
Just as a union must "act alone" to claim the statutory exemption, it
must also act in its "self-interest" to claim the exemption's benefit.46
Courts have held that a union acts in its "self-interest" when its activities
"bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate union interest."46 In
other words, when the union acts to protect wages, hours and other
working conditions-objectives at the heart of the national labor pol-
icy-the union acts in its "self-interest."46 9 Clearly, then, a union that is
enforcing or negotiating an agreement with an employer concerning
wages, hours or other terms and working conditions is acting in its "self-
interest." Thus, controversies arising from the terms or the enforcement
of such union-employer agreements satisfy the "self-interest" requ-
irement.
2. Summary
As this analysis indicates, controversies arising from the terms or
the enforcement of union-employer agreements470 satisfy the two-
pronged test articulated in Hutcheson and Allen Bradley. Therefore,
courts should analyze such agreements in the context of labor's statutory
exemption. However, the Supreme Court's manipulation of the Hutche-
son-Allen Bradley test has resulted in a bifurcated labor exemption.
The creation of the nonstatutory exemption is clearly antithetical to
the national labor laws. After all, the national labor laws compel unions
and employers to agree on certain terms. At the same time, however, the
existence of an agreement strips the union of its statutory protection
from the Sherman Act. Thus, unions are shielded from the Sherman Act
only by a limited and highly manipulable nonstatutory exemption.
The creation of the nonstatutory exemption also conflicts with Con-
gress' broad definition of "labor dispute" and public policy statements
found in the Norris-LaGuardia Act.471 The Court has narrowly con-
strued the term "labor dispute" and has failed to consider the public
policy argument. Finally, the Court's creation of a nonstatutory exemp-
tion is incompatible with the Court's own prior precedent. In Hutcheson
and Allen Bradley, the Court clearly envisioned statutory protection
467. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232.
468. See Adams, Ray & Rosenberg v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 403, 410
(C.D. Cal. 1976); see also Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d
1368, 1380 (lst Cir. 1981), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1120 (1982).
469. See Allied International, 640 F.2d at 1380.
470. See supra note 255.
471. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982).
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from the Sherman Act for those union-employer agreements dealing with
lawful union objectives.472 Following the Pennington case, however, the
Court has rejected this view.4 73
The time has come for the courts, and even Congress, to clearly
articulate the rules regarding labor's exemption from the Sherman Act.
Such clarification necessarily entails abolishing the nonstatutory exemp-
tion. The present bifurcated framework of analysis will not do. Union-
employer agreements, which for the most part are creatures of statutory
obligation, should receive greater protection from the Sherman Act than
the current analytical framework provides. The following section pro-
poses a workable framework to analyze all controversies arising from the
terms or the enforcement of union-employer agreements.
VII. PROPOSAL
Courts must abandon the nonstatutory exemption. In its place,
courts should adopt the underlying principles from the Apex Hosiery-
Hutcheson-Allen Bradley line of cases474 to analyze controversies arising
from the terms or the enforcement of union-employer agreements. This
approach would require courts to look beyond the mere fact that a
union-employer agreement exists.475 Instead, courts should focus on
whether the union-employer agreement satisfies the underlying principles
of the above three cases. This analysis imports a two-part approach.
A. Act Alone/Self-Interest
First, a court should analyze the disputed union-employer agree-
ment to determine whether the union "acted alone" and in its "self-inter-
est."476 Such a conclusion could be determined by finding that the
dispute arising from the union-employer agreement concerned wages,
472. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 227-37; Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 809.
473. See Connell, 421 U.S. at 621-23.
474. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); United States v. Hutcheson, 312
U.S. 219 (1941); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). See supra
notes 140-71, 224-89 and accompanying text.
475. The fundamental flaw in the Court's approach in the Pennington-Jewel Tea-Connell
line of cases was that the Court viewed the mere existence of a union-employer agreement as
enough to disallow the statutory exemption. However, under the Hutcheson-Allen Bradley
approach it was not the mere existence of a union-employer agreement that caused a union to
lose its statutory protection. Rather, it was the existence of a union-employer combination.
Thus, under the approach outlined in this Comment, the mere existence of a union-employer
agreement should be a neutral factor.
476. See supra notes 451-67 and accompanying text. The elements to satisfy the "self-inter-
est" test are almost identical to those needed to find a "labor dispute."
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hours or other terms and conditions of employment.477 If a court deter-
mined that the union "acted alone" and in its "self-interest," a "labor
dispute" exists, as that term is defined in section 13(c) of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.478
Once a court determines that a "labor dispute" exists, it should then
ask whether the union has combined with the employer by adopting the
employer's antitrust animus.47 9 Under this approach the focal point is
on whether the union sought to achieve its goal by eliminating competi-
tion in the labor market or whether the union adopted an antitrust means
to achieve its goal.480 If no antitrust combination is found, then any con-
troversy arising from the terms or the enforcement of a union-employer
agreement should be statutorily exempt from the Sherman Act.
Although the union conduct in such a situation may violate the national
labor laws,481 the conduct should not be proscribed by the Sherman Act.
B. Non-Labor Disputes
Controversies arising from the terms or the enforcement of union-
employer agreements that might not constitute a "labor dispute" should
not be protected by the statutory exemption. However, that is not to say
that such agreements are automatically exposed to Sherman Act scru-
tiny. Rather, to determine whether such agreements violate the Sherman
Act, a court must look to the principles outlined by Justice Stone in Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader.4" 2 In Apex Hosiery, the Court explored the scope
of the Sherman Act. The Court concluded that the Sherman Act only
477. See supra notes 467-69 and accompanying text.
478. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1982). See supra note 139 and accompanying text for the text of
section 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. This argument assumes that section 13(a) of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1982), has also been satisfied. Further, a finding
that the union acted in its "self-interest" would not only satisfy the "labor dispute" prong, but
will also satisfy the public policy approach outlined in this Comment. See supra notes 448-51
and accompanying text.
479. This position is consistent with Congress' intent in passing the Sherman, Clayton and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts: it ensures that only union-employer agreements that have adopted
antitrust purposes will be held to violate the Sherman Act. All other union-employer agree-
ments, although they may violate the national labor laws, will be free from Sherman Act
scrutiny.
480. This position helps promote the national labor laws. Under the national labor laws,
union-employer agreements are favored to help bring about industrial peace. However, under
the Court's current labor-antitrust scheme, these agreements are not being adequately pro-
tected from the Sherman Act. The nonstatutory exemption is too manipulable and unpredict-
able. Consequently, the policies underlying the national labor laws are being hampered.
Under the approach advocated by this Comment, however, these agreements would enjoy the
necessary protection, promoting the goals underlying the national labor laws.
481. See supra notes 172-215 and accompanying text.
482. 310 U.S. 469 (1940); see supra notes 140-71 and accompanying text.
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prohibited conduct aimed at eliminating competition in the commercial
market.483 The Court further recognized that restraints in the labor mar-
ket were permissible and did not come within the Sherman Act's
proscriptions.484
Therefore, in a situation where a controversy arising from the terms
or the enforcement of a union-employer agreement does not constitute a
"labor dispute," and thus is not entitled to statutory protection, the court
must explore the union's intent in entering into the agreement. If the
union intended to eliminate commercial competition, the Sherman Act
should apply. Likewise, if the court finds that the union did not intend to
restrain the commercial market, the Sherman Act should not apply.
There are several benefits to this analytical approach. First, it pro-
vides courts with a single analytical framework with which to analyze all
labor-antitrust problems. Second, this analytical approach would pro-
vide unions with certainty in this very confused area of the law. Courts
would no longer have the discretion to pick and choose which factors
will be given more weight in determining union liability under the Sher-
man Act.485 Third, this approach would govern all union-employer
agreements, regardless of whether a "labor dispute" exists. This ap-
proach also is in line with Congress' intent and would alleviate much of
the confusion surrounding labor-antitrust analysis. Finally, statutes
passed by Congress would be given their due effect.
VIII. CONCLUSION
By creating a nonstatutory exemption to deal with controversies
arising from the terms or the enforcement of union-employer agreements,
the Court has betrayed both Congress' intent and the Court's own prece-
dent. Consequently, labor-antitrust analysis has been turned on its head.
The time has come for courts, or Congress, to inject both certainty and
clarity into the labor-antitrust arena. This will necessarily require courts
to discard the nonstatutory exemption. Also, the Supreme Court must
reexamine the way it has chosen to define the statutory exemption. Con-
gress, as well as the Court in its early decisions, clearly envisioned broad
statutory protection from the Sherman Act for both unilateral union con-
duct and union-employer agreements. The time has come for the Court
to again recognize this broad statutory protection. Until this is done,
unions will continue to be unsure as to how far they can go without
483. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 492-93, 493 n.15.
484. Id. at 502-04.
485. As applied today, the nonstatutory exemption is both highly manipulable and very
uncertain in application. See supra notes 392-403 and accompanying text.
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incurring Sherman Act liability when entering into agreements with em-
ployers. Such uncertainty should not exist in the labor-antitrust arena.
Joseph L. Greenslade*
* This comment is dedicated to my mother and father, as well as to Kathy Snelling, for
their constant love and support. Further, the Author would like to thank Professor Terry
Collingsworth for his comments, and specially thank Howard Rosen and Michael Posner,
Posner & Rosen, for introducing the Author to the labor-law field.
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